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A.  GENERAL  
The Federal Government’s role as the lead developer and owner of advance 
technologies has steadily diminished over time.  One key reason is the widening of 
Research & Development (R&D) spending between Government and private sources.  
Since the 1990s, federally sponsored R&D has decreased by an average of 1.2 percent per 
year, whereas those efforts funded by private industry grew an average of 6.2 percent 
annually (Federal Support for Research and Development, 2007, p. 3).  Figure 1 provides 
a graphical depiction.  Significant technological innovations now take place in the private 
sector as the commercial marketplace rewards these firms with greater return on 
investment and higher profit.  As a result, the Government no longer holds the dominant 
position in technology for defense and space-based purposes that it once enjoyed in areas 
such as nuclear energy, jet engines, radar, and micro-electronics (Dunn, 2005, p. 6).  
 
Figure 1.   U.S. Spending for R&D from 1953 to 2004 by Source (From: Federal Support 
for Research and Development, 2007, p. 2) 
  
The Government recognized the importance of leveraging commercial sources for 
their R&D capability and expertise; therefore, they needed to go outside traditional 
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defense sources to acquire certain “cutting edge” technologies from the commercial 
marketplace to support operational requirements.  The July 1993 Defense Science Board 
Report provides an example for adopting a more commercial approach in order to attain 
significant cost, schedule, and performance reductions and improvements: 
Motorola developed STU-III Secure Telephone. In the '80s, Motorola was 
selected to build the STU-III secure communications terminal on the basis 
of development of a dual use commercial product. The development took 
3 years compared to an estimated 7-11 year “normal” DoD cycle, and cost 
an estimated one-tenth a DoD military specified item. (p. 18) 
To capitalize on these opportunities, defense reform initiatives from the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 
1996 (FARA) were enacted to simplify the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) by 
reducing procurement regulations and promoting the use of commercial acquisition.  
Dual-use programs were also developed and funded under the Clinton administration to 
benefit the military and civilian marketplace (Reppy, 2000, p. 6). 
Despite the efforts set forth by Government to access R&D from private industry, 
these companies must also be willing participants in the process as well.  Unfortunately, 
indications reveal that private industry maintains reservations about providing R&D 
solutions to the Government.  The most astounding analysis about industry came from an 
article titled “Leading Commercial Firms Shun DoD and R&D" (1994) by management 
consultant Robert Spreng.  By comparing DoD Research Development Test & Evaluation 
(RDT&E) with those of Business Week and Fortune 500, Spreng discovered 95 percent 
of the industry group leaders with the greatest percentage of sales invested in R&D 
received insignificant or no DoD RDT&E awards (Memorandum of Law, 1996, p. 9). 
Spreng concluded: 
Commercial firms will offer the government significantly more of the 
needed technologies, some right off the laboratory shelf, when the 
Government can make available adequate protection for commercially 
oriented intellectual property and the use of existing commercial 
accounting methods for R&D. (Ibid, 1996, p. 9) 
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A more recent study by the Department of Commerce (DoC) Bureau of Industry 
and Security, with Trotta Associates (2003), revealed similar findings to Spreng when 
assessing private companies’ attitudes toward sharing new commercial technologies with 
the DoD.  This study analyzed 431 responses of companies in four technology fields, 
discovering that many companies were still reluctant to discuss R&D programs with DoD 
and citing the following reasons:  
• Procurement complexity that includes added regulations and bureaucracy, 
contributing to higher operating costs; 
• Financial incentives are not obvious since Federal budget are affected by 
political factors, regulations that limited profitability, and prohibition on 
long-term relationships; 
• Communication difficulties between private firms and the Government; 
• Believed Government will mismanage intellectual property (IP) and result 
in losing a company’s competitive advantage; 
• Potential for product irrelevance in providing to the Government, and 
• Concerns from small business in not being able to comply with cost and 
administrative requirements (Trotta, Air Force, & Department of 
Commerce, 2003, pp. 1-5). 
B.  CONCEPT OF OTA 
Other Transaction Authority for Prototype Development (OTA) was established 
by Section 845 granting specific authority to Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) and then to DoD military services.  This authority allowed certain 
government agencies to engage with industry through formal agreements outside standard 
procurement contracting regulations in order to access commercial or private industry 
technologies to develop prototypes of weapon systems or weapon related components 
(See Chapter II for detailed OTA Historical Legislation).  
1. Benefits  
Many of the challenges—as identified in the preceding paragraphs—for 
Government in seeking to conduct business with private industry can be resolved with the 
OTA as an alternative procurement tool.  OTAs can enable the DoD and other 
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Governmental entities to attract these companies (i.e., non-traditional firms) to participate 
and provide their technological capabilities and expertise in producing innovative and 
advanced prototypes of weapons systems or components.   They are most appropriate for 
projects that provide joint development of products with future market potential (i.e., 
dual-use technology), necessary flexibility given the high-risk nature associated with 
these projects, and provide the opportunity for DoD to benefit from innovative business 
relationships (Smith, Drezner, Lachow, & National Defense Research Institute, 2002, p. 
33).  In general, an OTA instrument provides the Government and industry enormous 
flexibility by:  
• Allowing unique arrangements in the way IP is managed where the Bayh-
Dole Act is not applicable; 
• Bypassing most procurement regulations and statutes like the Truth in 
Negotiations Act; 
• Reducing much of the administrative and cost oversight associated with 
Government contracts such as Cost Accounting Standards (CAS); and 
• Permitting the use of creative agreement structures to maximize 
performance between Government and private industry. 
These benefits as well as others have been documented by various Government 
and Government-sponsored reports.  A 2000 report to Congress reported benefits to 
include “attracting firms that typically did not contract with DoD, enabling use of 
commercial products or processes, providing more flexibility to negotiate agreement 
terms and conditions, and reducing program costs” (Acquisition reform: DoD's guidance 
on using Section 845 agreements, 2000, p. 4).  A 2002 Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report surveyed agreement officers who conducted OTAs to determine the 
benefits from a user standpoint.  The results of this survey are shown in Figure 3.  As 
seen here, three benefits stand out: use commercial technologies or practices, attract 
commercial firms, and flexibility in negotiating terms and conditions. 
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Figure 2.   Reasons Cited by DoD Components for Using OTAs, 1999 Survey (From: 
Acquisition reform: DoD's guidance on using Section 845, 2000, p. 13) 
 
RAND (2002) assessed 21 out of 72 OTA projects conducted during the 1994-
1998 timeframe.  The RAND study found OTAs provided benefits that went beyond the 
expansion of the industry base even though evidence of new companies entering to do 
business with DoD was few (Smith et al., p. 17).  The assessment documented the 
following benefits: (1) New activity from large suppliers (e.g., Motorola, 3M, Lucent, 
Eastman Kodak, Oracle, and others) who previously focused on commercial projects 
were more willing to work for DoD under an OTA; (2) Change and adaptability are 
inherent to the OTA process, so the agreement usually contains a clause stating “that any 
time progress or results indicate that a change would be beneficial to project objectives, 
such a change can be made through mutual agreement of DoD and industry managers,” 
providing better use of industry resources and management of risks; (3) The objectives of 
 6
an OTA are stated in terms of general goals vice specifications, allowing for greater 
creativity with progress payment incentives contingent on successful completion of a 
milestone event; (4) Innovative arrangements (e.g., negotiate independently, industry 
partnership via informal consortium, progress payments to satisfactory completion of 
milestone events, direct involvement with prime contractor and subcontractors) can result 
since circumstances surrounding each agreement are unique; and (5) OTA procedures can 
yield more value per DoD dollar invested by leveraging private investment through cost-
risk-benefit sharing, reducing transaction and overhead costs, providing more authority in 
Government/industry management team, and allowing significant cost avoidance (Ibid., 
pp. 15-24). 
A 2007 Logistics Management Institute (LMI) analysis on Other Transactions 
also reported positive benefits on OTAs based on interviews, case studies, and 
questionnaire respondents.  In general, the LMI report placed the OTA benefits in five 
categories: (1) Streamlining and flexibility; (2) Performance improvements; (3) Schedule 
reductions; (4) Cost reductions; and (5) Participation by non-traditional defense 
contractors in which 84 percent of all OTAs awarded in FY01-FY05 had significant 
participation by non-traditionals (Ablard et al., 2007, Ch. 2, pp. 2-9). 
2. Concerns 
There have been concerns with using OTAs since they do not need to conform to 
normal controls and oversight standards found in traditional FAR-based contracts.  As a 
result, it is believed that DoD’s interests may be fall victim to greater costs and risks.  
RAND (2002) identifies a number of concerns from its assessment:  
• DoD’s loss of intellectual property right; 
• Its loss of cost standards; and 
• Inability to establish metrics to measure OTA success (e.g., cost, 




Overall, the RAND report determined that the Government’s risk is limited in 
utilizing OTAs despite a few programs where oversight was reduced and the 
understanding that the associated risks cannot be completely assessed at the time of the 
report (Ibid., 2002, pp. 31-32). 
C.  OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH  
The purpose of this report is to explore the opportunities available for non-
traditional companies to transition their completed prototype project for follow-on 
production with DoD.  Prototype development under OTA provides non-traditional firms 
the ability to compete for DoD awards and not be subject to numerous regulations and 
contracting requirements associated with FAR, legislation imposed by Congress, and cost 
accounting principles.  While OTAs provide opportunities for non-traditional firms to 
compete for prototype weapons, the transition to production and support is conditioned 
by what is allowable under regulations (i.e., FAR and Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS)).  Since it has been approximated that 80 percent of 
lifecycle costs of a weapons acquisition program reside in the operations and support 
(O&S) aspects, it is possible that the production and sustainment of a weapons system 
provide greater profit potential.   
D.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. Primary Research Question  
To what extent have transition opportunities been made available to and utilized 
by non-traditional firms to extend their completed prototype under the OTA to DoD 
production? 
2.  Secondary Research Questions  
What aspects of the OTA attract the non-traditional firms to do business with the 
Government?  
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What are the transitioning opportunities experienced by the non-traditional firms 
that have conducted OTA agreements? 
What are the transitioning opportunities available and used by DoD officials? 
What are the barriers, if any, encountered by the non-traditional firms that limit 
transitioning opportunities? 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This research looks at the transition opportunities available to non-traditionals that 
have completed an OTA for prototyping.  To assess the efficacy of different opportunities 
afforded by Congress through legislation, statutes, and regulations provided in the FAR, 
an electronic survey is used on a sample set of non-traditional firms that have utilized 
OTAs.  Interviews with DoD and industry officials who have extensive experience and 
knowledge in the subject matter are also utilized to determine if current practices in OTA 
are satisfactory or require improvements to enable greater participation from non-
traditional firms. 
F.  ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH  
This thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter I briefly introduces the concept of 
OTA and purpose of the research.  Chapter II provides extensive background on OTAs, 
including literature review on previous OTA analyses, the macro environment, the 
legislative history, and an overview of alternative programs that also offer prototyping 
outside standard procurement procedures.  Chapter III provides transition opportunities 
for OTAs as well as two unique models whose processes may result in follow-on 
production.  Chapter IV summarizes the analysis of survey results (non-traditional firms) 
and interviews with DoD and industry officials.  Chapter V presents conclusions and 





A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a general background that is relevant to the analysis of 
follow-on opportunities for non-traditional firms with completed OTA projects.  This 
chapter begins with a detailed literature review of previous analyses conducted on OTAs.   
The researchers also examine the current macro-environment with a strategic analysis of 
the defense industry, indicating why the OTA authority is a necessary tool for procuring 
critical technologies from private industry.  This chapter then reviews OTA legislative 
history and alternative programs to OTAs available in DoD. 
B.  PREVIOUS ANALYSES  
Prior analyses have been conducted on OTA authority as theses, journal articles, 
and private institution studies on behalf of DoD.  The majority of the studies tend to 
examine the efficacy of OTA, focusing on the benefits and limitations to DoD and 
industry participants.  The exceptions are Hayes (1998), who developed a model to assist 
in determining if an OTA is the proper procurement agreement for DoD buying activities, 
and Stamatopoulos (1999), who attempted to develop standard metrics to monitor OTAs. 
The most recent study was completed in 2007 by the Logistics Management 
Institute (LMI), a Government-focused consulting group, which gathered information on 
the recent usages of both types of Other Transactions (OTs) from multiple sources, 
including questionnaires, case studies, and interviews as well as different literature and 
databases.  The study’s purposes are described as follows: 
…to gather a comprehensive body of information about recent usage of 
these instruments, look into the parameters for their use, and assess their 
value in the current environment…to develop an up-to-date overview of 
their use; the successes, best practices, and benefits realized through their 
use; and their limitations. (Ablard et al., 2007, p. iii) 
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Overall, the LMI study is very extensive and offers positive feedback from DoD 
respondents on the use of these instruments due to their flexibility, performance 
improvements, schedule reductions, cost reductions, and access to non-traditional firms.  
It highlights to DoD that OTs are valuable and should be maintained, and even expanded, 
for the purposes of research and prototyping to transition critical technologies from non-
traditional sources (Ibid, 2007).  This analysis revealed the significant use of non-
traditional firms participating to a significant degree in new prototype awards from 
FY2001-FY2005 (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1.   Level of Participation by Non-Traditionals in OTAs from FY 2001-2005 
(From: Ablard et al., 2007, p. E-1) 
 
Contrary to the finding of non-traditional involvement presented in the LMI 
Report, Hanson’s (2005) analysis determined that OTAs have not met the intent of 
Congress in providing DoD access to non-traditional firms for private sector R&D.  His 
report examines all agreements documented in the DoD’s Annual Report to Congress on 
all OTs for FY1997-FY2003, and categorizes the amounts awarded to recipients on the 
basis of firm type (e.g., non-traditional, major defense contractor, etc.) (p. 4).   His 
research is limited to data derived primarily from the Annual Reports; therefore, the 
methodology to categorize award amounts by firm type is not entirely accurate for two 
reasons.  First, the analysis neither accounted for nor distinguished the various kinds of 
organizations involved in the alliances and consortiums formed to develop a prototype or 
to conduct research.  For example, the OTA agreement between the Chemical, 
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Biological, & Radiological Technology Alliance (CBRTA) and National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) consists of approximately a dozen firms whose membership 
includes traditional defense, commercial, academic, and nonprofit organizations (OTA 
Agreement between CBRTA and NGA, 2007, pp. 2-5).  Additionally, the funding 
amounts within an alliance are difficult to characterize and not verifiable given the 
complexity of the arrangements for each prototype developed.  Further, there are 
agreements awarding a large defense contractor with non-traditional involvement who 
provided a significant effort to the OTA.   
A 2002 RAND briefing offers a qualitative assessment of 21 sample OTA 
projects out of a total of 72 conducted in the 1994-1998 timeframe.  This report examines 
the general characteristics of OTA agreements, the benefits of using them, disadvantages 
that were encountered in terms of protecting DoD interests, and a determination of the net 
effects in comparing their advantages and disadvantages.  The assessment produces three 
conclusions that the RAND researchers considered as subjective.  First, OTAs expanded 
the industry base for DoD with commercial and private firms that are more willing to 
participate because they find these arrangements less restrictive.  Second, the OTA 
process provides a broad range of benefits to include improved use of industry resources 
and better risk management for DoD.  Further, the immediate rewards outweigh the 
inherent risks associated with OTAs due to less oversight requirements (Smith et al., 
2002, pp. vii-ix). 
Bloch and McEwen (2002) published a journal article that highlights the problems 
for Government in attracting high-technology companies to conduct business.  They state 
that the issues stem primarily from the differences between Government and private 
industries’ approaches to intellectual property (IP), primarily over the treatment of IP 
rights when they are Government-funded (therefore affording the Government “march-
in” rights per the Bayh-Dole Act).  To help the Government in acquiring high-technology 
solutions from private firms, they recommend applying non-traditional methods, in 
particular the OTA that are not subject to FAR and other procurement statutes (pp. 196-
199, 209-210). 
 12
Gilliland (2001) assesses OTAs to determine whether these instruments have been 
effective in attracting non-traditional participation to do business with DoD.  His findings 
show that OTAs have attracted non-traditional firms, though participation of traditional 
defense contractors in these arrangements was still substantial (Gilliland, 2001, pp. 66-
70).   Note that only Gilliland’s thesis ventures to determine if non-traditional firms 
performed follow-on work for DoD and what kind of procurement vehicle was utilized.  
From his survey results, five out of the seven respondents indicated that further business 
with DoD was done after completion of the OTA.  Only four out of the five participants 
provided an answer as to what procurement vehicle was utilized for follow-on business, 
as depicted in Figure 3 (Ibid, pp. 67-70). 
However, his study does not differentiate the type of follow-on opportunities from 
DoD.  It is difficult to discern: (1) transition from the OTA prototype directly to 
production, (2) if the OTA “opened doors” to provide additional work in the form of 
OTAs or standard procurement contracts, or (3) if additional work was the result of a 
successful bid and award for continued projects.  The correlation between the original 
OTA and follow-on work was not clearly established.   
 
Figure 3.   Type Of Vehicle Used To Form Follow-On Relationships With DoD (From: 
Gilliland, 2001, p. 69) 
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Stamatopoulos (1999) develops a core of four measures as a standard of metrics 
to apply in monitoring the performances of OTAs.  His research methodology was 
derived primarily by surveying 15 different DoD buying activities for their contract 
management metrics and then applying Training Resources and Data Exchange’s metric 
to analyze the results (pp. 50-51, 135).  However, with the survey to the different buying 
commands being quite broad, there is no mention as to whether the respective 
organizations had any experience with conducting an OTA agreement.  There was also no 
consideration given to how OTA agreements are structured, since each arrangement 
could be executed with one firm, one firm with sub-tier partners, multiple firms under a 
consortium, competed by different firms in multiple phases, and so forth.  This may be 
attributed to the uniqueness of each OTA agreement as having to meet the satisfaction of 
the participants involved (Smith, et al., 2002, p. 12). 
Slade (1998) examines the efficacy of the Commercial Operations and Support 
Savings Initiative (COSSI) in attracting non-traditional contractors for the purpose of 
taking existing commercial products and processes, and modifying them into existing 
weapons systems to provide substantial O&S costs for the military.  The COSSI program 
utilizes OTA as a procurement method to establish these agreements.  He selected 30 
COSSI agreements from 81 proposals initiated in 1997 to conduct interviews with DoD 
and industry officials associated with these agreements.  His results reveal the following: 
63 percent of the samples were traditional contractors;1 and 80 percent believed OTA 
was not a factor in conducting business with DoD, but identified more closely to the 
business opportunity COSSI provided (pp. 21, 52).   His paper also highlights the 
importance of OTAs in providing opportunities for DoD work with non-traditional firms: 
Several of the small, non-traditional contractors stated that the use of a 
Section 845 Agreement was a critical factor in their decision to respond to 
the solicitation.  They contended that if a traditional method had been 
used, they could not have obtained the required, Government-approved 
systems in the time allocated (p. 56). 
                                                 
1 For this study, “Traditional Contractors are defined as those whose business processes are 
predominantly oriented towards doing business with the Government” whereas “Non-traditional 
Contractors are those business processes oriented towards doing business with the commercial sector.” 
(Slade, 1998, p. 92) 
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Hayes (1998) developed a prescriptive business model to assist the decision 
maker in determining if an OTA is the appropriate procurement method, as shown in 
Figure 4.  The information supporting this model is derived from the interviews with 43 
acquisition professionals (pp. 53-54, 92-93). 
 
Figure 4.   Hayes OT Decision Model  (From: Hayes, 1998, p. 94) 
  
Kuyath (1995) attempts to promote awareness to DoD of OTAs, with the potential 
for reducing R&D costs and reducing barriers to high-technology commercial companies’ 
participating with DoD in developing dual-use technologies (p. 522).  He presents an in-
depth description of the origin and the authority for DoD to enter into OTAs, and then 
provides a detailed structure of the DARPA and Air Force OTA agreement models 
followed with a comparative analysis between the two organizations’ agreement types 
(pp. 525-530, 542-570).  To stimulate greater use for the benefit of DoD and private 
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industry, he recommends: (1) Giving both TIA and OTA authority over all Government 
agencies to initiate research projects and conduct prototyping; (2) Conditioning a 
requirement of 50 percent cost-sharing aspect to account for market-risk as well as IR&D 
costs incurred by the company prior to OTA; and (3) Revising legislation to state that 
OTs are not subject to the Bayh-Dole Act so that a firm’s IP rights are adequately 
protected in OT agreements via revised legislation (p. 575). 
C. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE MACRO ENVIRONMENT 
1.  Porter’s Five-Forces Model Analysis 
Porter’s Five-Forces Model is used to analyze the defense industry to show how 
major defense firms maintain a large degree of competitive advantage in the research, 
development, and production of weapons and weapon systems.  This analysis examines 
each aspect independently, starting with Rivalry from Competing Sellers, Supplier 
Power, Threat of Substitutes, Threat of New Entrants, and Threat of Buyers (Porter, 
1980). 
a. Rivalry from Competing Sellers 
This industry is dominated by five top-tier firms: Lockheed Martin, 
Boeing, BAE Systems, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon.  Compared with other firms 
in the industry, these five lead in most categories including company size, amount of 
defense contract dollars awarded, and the high level of capability ranges the company 
maintains. Table 2 displays these firms by respective rankings in terms of total revenue 
earned for 2007.  One should note that a large number of smaller firms operate beneath 
the five top-tier defense contractors to support the various needs of DoD and its complex 
weapons systems requirements.2 
 
                                                 
2 For the purposes of this paper, the defense industry is characterized by a three-tier structure based on 
company size, amount of defense contract dollars awarded, and the level of capabilities range the company 
maintains.  The major defense contractors (Tier 1) followed by medium-sized firms (Tier 2) and then small 
contractors (Tier 3). 
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Table 2.   Top Five Defense Firms by Total Defense Revenue Earned in 2007 
















$36,090.00  34,225.00 $39,620.00  91% 
2 Boeing    30,800.00 29,200.00   61,530.00 50 
3 BAE 
Systems 
  25,070.60 20,935.20   26,967.60 93 
4 Northrop 
Grumman  
  23,649.00 23,332.00   30,148.00 78.4 
5 Raytheon    19,500.00 18,200.00   20,291.00 96.1 
*In millions of U.S. dollars, at the end of each firm's fiscal year 
 
 
The dominance of Tier 1 firms is evident in the contract amounts awarded.  
Table 3 shows the top five defense contractors ranked on the basis of aggregate contract 
award dollars for 2005 and 2006.  The data were compiled by the DoD Statistical 
Information Analysis Division based on procurement actions (i.e., definitive contracts, 
obligated portions of letter contracts, job orders, task orders, delivery orders, and any 
other orders against existing contracts) reported on Individual Contracting Action Reports 
with adjustments from modifications (Statistical Information Analysis Division Website, 
2007).  The top five firms were awarded over $84 billion collectively, representing 
approximately 26 percent of total Federal procurement spending (Ibid., 2007). 
 
Table 3.   Top 100 Companies Receiving The Largest Dollar Volume Of  Prime 




Rank Company Name 
2006 2005 2006 2005 
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION 26.6 19.4 1 1 
BOEING COMPANY 20.3 18.3 2 2 
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION 16.6 13.5 3 3 
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION 10.5 10.6 4 4 
RAYTHEON COMPANY 10.1 9.1 5 5 
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The barriers for exit for these large, traditional contractors are very high, 
given the investment in expensive equipment, machinery, and facilities and highly 
specialized workforce required in producing and delivering various weapons and 
weapons systems.  PESTEL analysis further explores some key driving factors that have 
contributed to the dominance of these five traditional contractors. 
b. Supplier Power  
Differentiation of inputs in this industry is high, given the complexity of 
weapons systems produced today.  Switching costs of firms exist depending on certain 
commodity types; but, given the cost-type contracts in DoD procurement, the costs 
associated with inputs in material, labor, and operating are reimbursed by the 
Government.  Cost-reimbursement contracts alone represent over 40 percent of Federal 
contracts utilized in 2005 (Defense contracting improved insight and controls needed 
over DoD's time-and-materials contracts, 2007, p. 12).  Appendix A shows a breakdown 
of the different contract types used in DoD for FY1996-2005.  
Of concern is the accessibility of strategic materials (e.g., steel, aluminum, 
composites, super alloys, etc.) necessary for DoD purposes.  A 2007 Industry Report on 
Strategic Materials by The Industrial College of the Armed Forces highlights some 
challenges that are relevant to the defense industry:  (1) Receding National Defense 
Stockpile amounts since 1992; (2) Availability issues stemming from global competition, 
namely high demands from China and India; and (3) Protectionist policies such as the 
Buy American Act and Berry Amendment restrict defense firms from purchasing 
material from outside the United States (2007, pp. 10-11). 
The supply chain of the industry also entails the prime contractor 
relationship of large firms subcontracting to take advantage of smaller firms for their 
specialties and capabilities.  The smaller firms depend on top firms for their ability to win 
large defense contracts and expertise in managing them.  For example, the challenges and 
costs in complying with contracting guidelines in the FAR create difficulties for small 
firms to conduct business with the Government.  In fact, top-tier firms have assumed the 
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role of “Lead System Integrator” to facilitate the integration of different technologies 
from various subcontractors for a particular weapons program.  This practice first started 
in “March 2002 when the U.S. Army and DARPA selected the team of Boeing Co., 
Chicago, and Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), San Diego, to become the 
lead systems integrator (LSI) for the service’s multibillion-dollar Future Combat Systems 
program” (Ratnam, 2007). 
c. Threat of Substitutes 
Threats of substitutes are non-existent for traditional contractors in 
providing weapons in the U.S.  There exists global competition from foreign defense 
firms, but these companies are precluded as authorized sources of procurement by DoD 
from legislative measures.  The Buy American Act (41 USC 10a-10d) prevents agencies 
within DoD from purchasing foreign weapons with few exceptions as noted in the FAR.3  
But, joint ventures between U.S. and foreign contractors have been allowed to leverage 
capabilities for co-development (e.g., Joint Strike Fighter) and access to new markets 
(e.g., French company EADS’ bid on KC-135 Air Force Tanker replacement).  These are 
known as “offsets” that are “commercial or industrial benefits that a company offers a 
foreign government as an inducement or condition for the purchase of military goods or 
services” (Defense trade contractors engage in varied international alliances, 2000, p. 4). 
d. Threat of New Entrants 
New entrant threat persists in the defense industry because innovative 
firms can provide unique solutions that larger and more traditional firms are unable to 
offer.  But, dominant firms are able to leverage their strength in size, resources, 
capabilities, and even relationships to ensure contract awards for the largest defense 
contracts.  Top-tier firms can effectively use lower tier sized companies with specialties 
for subcontracting purposes.  In turn, these firms must compete between themselves for 
                                                 
3 FAR provides the following exceptions to the Buy American Act:  (1) Impracticable or inconsistent 
with public interest, (2) Nonavailability, and (3) Unreasonable cost. Subpart 25.202 provides these 
exceptions in greater detail. 
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these subcontracts.  Large firms can also acquire these firms through mergers and 
acquisitions for their attractive capabilities, while minimizing competition.   
Industry consolidation has reduced the number of major defense 
contractors.  According to Pierre Chao, Senior Fellow and Director at the Defense-
Industrial Initiatives, “Wall Street wanted more. Electronics were growing in importance 
in the (defense) industry…So the boardrooms pushed a new round of integration, this 
time vertical, picking up IT and electronics suppliers…By the end of the 1990s, 107 firms 
had become five” (Chao, 2005).  Figure 5 shows an industry consolidation of major 




Figure 5.   Snapshot of U.S. Defense Industry Consolidation, 1990-2000 (From: 
Markusen, 2000, p. 32) 
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e. Threat of Buyers 
The “buyers” are primarily the respective services in DoD.  But, there is 
influence from multiple stakeholders that include the President, Secretary of Defense, and 
Congress, who holds the power of the “purse.”  To procure large-scale weapons and their 
lifecycle support, the “buyers” essentially must procure from the Tier 1 contractors who 
hold the capabilities to research, develop, produce, and sustain. 
2.  PESTEL Analysis 
PESTEL Analysis examines the general environment surrounding the defense 
industry in a macro perspective.  Its focus is on six main areas: Political, Economic, 
Sociocultural, Technological, Ecological, and Legal issues (Ventresca, 2007).  The 
Ecological issues were disregarded in this analysis since DoD mandates compliance to 
Federal environmental laws, with not much significance attributed to ecological issues in 
the defense industry. 
a. Political 
The defense industry is affected by changes in the political environment as 
it may impact funding and legislative support for defense-related issues.  Therefore, the 
defense industry dedicates a large amount of resources to ensure its agenda is supported 
by the Government and in the public.  The “Iron Triangle” helps to illustrate how the 
defense industry effectively maintains a strong political agenda through interest groups or 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and influences DoD and Congress (Calhoun, 
1992, p. 2).  As suggested in Figure 6, these groups may lobby, educate, and pressure to 
affect public policy on behalf of the defense industry they represent.  Interest groups 





Figure 6.   The “Iron Triangle” (From: 
http://www.thebestlinks.com/images/5/5b/Irontriangle.PNG) 
 
Defense trade organizations leverage information and provide 
Government interaction to gain support from members that include defense firms as well 
as individuals in the private and public sectors. According to Dombrowski and Gholz 
(2006), the defense industry “maintain large and active lobbying organizations including 
the American Shipbuilding Association to remind the public of their views of the benefits 
of preserving existing firms (and their facilities)” (p. 141).  For example, the Aerospace 
Industries Association of America publicizes their 2008 agenda: “Keeping America 
Strong: Advance U.S. Global Leadership in Aerospace and Defense,” whereas the 
National Defense Industrial Association vision is “America’s Leading Defense Industry 
Association Promoting National Security” (Aerospace Industries Association Website, 
2007; National Defense Industrial Website, 2007). 
Lobbying groups place emphasis on funding and relationships to ensure 
political support of defense programs.  Defense firms employ multiple lobbying groups to 
represent their interests.  For example, the top-ten major defense contractors spent over 
$324 million in campaign contributions from 1998 to 2004 (Makison, 2004). 
Defense firms also operate outside the triangle with campaign 
contributions to both party committees and candidates.  From 1998 to 2003, “the top 737 
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defense contractors gave $61.6 million in campaign contributions to Republican Party 
committees and $26.4 million to Democratic Party committees,” followed by 
contributions to individuals, but with the top recipients belonging to the House and 
Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees (Ibid., 2004). 
The triangle may change according to the updated DoD policy regarding 
information sharing with NGOs.  As noted in a recent FCW Media Group article, “The 
Defense Department’s new information-sharing strategy will require officials to 
anticipate their data being used by non-governmental organizations, coalition partners, 
other Federal agencies, and state and local governments” (Miller, 2007).  The extent of 
this new policy may enhance the relationships between DoD and NGOs, thereby 
improving the defense industry’s political influence. 
b. Economic & Sociocultural 
The long-term U.S. budgetary outlook is a concern to the defense industry 
as well as to Government officials and private citizens.  This is despite the most recent 
defense budget request for FY08, asking for a base discretionary budget of $481.4 billion 
along with a supplemental for supporting the war of $141.7 billion (Jane's Defense 
Website, 2007).  The economic concern stems from the projected availability of 
Government funding (i.e., discretionary budget) for defense spending.  The trend for 
discretionary funding has been steadily decreasing since the 1960s due to mandatory 
spending expenditures (e.g., Social Security, Medicare, etc.) caused by an aging 
population and shrinking workforce (See Appendix B). Projections such as the one 
shown in Figure 7 show how mandatory spending programs will slowly squeeze out 









Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. technological innovations have 
shifted away from the defense-related initiatives to market-driven research due to drastic 
reductions in military spending.  The military budgets in R&D decreased 26 percent in 
real terms from 1987 to 2000 (Markusen, 2000, p. 28).  This is currently evident by the 
large number of major technological advancements being fielded in the commercial 
sector.  A document published by the Council of Competitiveness states that, 
“Technology base funding by the DoD is reaching a 35-year low” where “manufacturing 
companies contribute nearly 75 percent of total industry R&D funding” (Council of 
Competitive Website, 2007). 
d. Legislative 
A number of laws and acquisition policies have helped shape the defense 
industry into what it is today.  Most notable is the Commercial Item Authority passed by 
Congress in 1994 to acquire commercial items readily available from the market with 
 24
minimum oversight in the procurement process.  The idea was driven by the goal of 
improving commercial item acquisition with emphasis on accessing technologies 
developed in the private sector.  This is especially the case where “commercial sector 
leads innovation in telecommunications, software, and information systems, increasing 
the need for DoD to find means to access this technology” (Managing the supplier base in 
the 21st century, 2006, p. 4).  The authority was expanded in the Fiscal Year 1996 
Defense Authorization Act.  This “simplified commercial item acquisition by authorizing, 
for a three-year period, commercial item buys up to $5.5 million in contract value to be 
purchased using greatly simplified procedures” and sidesteps cost or pricing data 
requirements (1996 Annual Defense Report, 1996, Ch. 14).  Figure 8 provides an 




Figure 8.   Overview of Commercial Acquisition Legislative History (From: DoD 
contracting efforts needed to address Air Force commercial acquisition risk, 2006, p. 5) 
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Although intended to spur commercial acquisition, improper classification 
of commercial acquisitions has resulted with many instances of large awards going to 
traditional contractors inappropriately designated as commercial.  Most notable are the 
Inspector General findings on Air Force acquisitions for the C-130J cargo aircraft, the 
KC-767A tanker aircraft, and F-16 simulator services where commercial procurement 
was applied (DoD contracting efforts needed to address Air Force commercial acquisition 
risk, 2006, p. 14). 
The Bush administration has advocated the approach of commercial 
acquisition to include purchasing beyond existing commercial requirements.  A June 
2006 report published by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government 
Reform states: “Bush Administration has interpreted the ‘commercial item’ exemption to 
cover a multitude of items that are not subject to open market forces. In 2003, the White 
House Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued a memorandum advocating, in bold 
print, “that Federal agencies use the commercial item authority to buy noncommercial 
items” (Dollars not sense, 2006, p. 17). 
Acquisition policy has also been realigned to ensure the defense industrial 
base will be sustained for the remaining traditional defense contractors.  Examples 
include: (1) “Dual Lead Ship Strategy” mandated by the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics for the procurement of DDG-1000 and the Littoral 
Combat Ship programs to ensure the two remaining defense shipbuilding firms were 
provided the opportunity to develop and produce a respective prototype of each ship; (2) 
“Leader Company Strategy” under FAR Subpart 17.401 where the contractor with the 
winning proposal must share design and other critical proprietary information to the 
losing proposal contractor in order to have a portion of the contract work; and (3) 
“Winner Take All” competition format for the $200 billion Joint Strike Fighter program 
between Lockheed-Martin and Boeing where both contractors were given the opportunity 
to design, develop, and produce a prototype for demonstration, which would lead to the 
follow-on contract award (Garamone, 2001).  If all else fails, the Defense Procurement 
Act provides a variety of safeguards to maintain the defense industrial base for national 
security reasons.  In particular, Title III authorizes the President to “provide appropriate 
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incentives to develop, maintain, modernize, and expand the productive capacities of 
domestic sources for critical components, critical technology items, and industrial 
resources essential for the execution of the national security strategy of the United States” 
(50 USC App. §2061).  These incentives may entail loans, loan guarantees, purchase 
commitments, production equipment leases, and so forth. 
Even though small defense contractors are limited by size, they have been 
afforded incentives from legislation and the FAR to provide financing options and 
dedicated procurement dollars through set-aside programs.  Medium-sized firms, on the 
other hand, have no legislation or policies that provide them protection or special 
treatment.  As a result, medium-sized firms (i.e., Tier II defense contractors) are 
experiencing a decline in their share of defense contract dollars.  A 2007 Washington 
Post article reported, “In 1995, mid-tier services companies received 44 percent of 
Government contracts, while large firms took 37 percent of the market…By 2005, mid-
tier companies took 33 percent of the market while large firms shared in 46 percent” 
(Goldfarb, 2007). 
From the Five-forces and PESTLE analyses, the major defense contractors 
have the most advantages doing businesses with the DoD, whereas the small- and 
medium-sized firms are not able to compete at the same level.  These defense firms have 
established a firm foothold to conduct business with the Government and military that is 
reinforced with their ability to influence via the “Iron Triangle” and policies that favor 
protecting the defense industrial base.  Therefore, it is even more critical for the DoD to 
access innovative technologies from a greater number of non-traditional competitors. 
D. HISTORICAL LEGISLATION 
1.  Relevant Legislation 
 Over time, the OTA authority to prototype has been modified on different 
occasions by three legislative amendment types.  These amendments have sought to:  
• Expand the authority to other organizations (note: OTA authority has also 
been granted to Government organizations outside DoD; this will be 
covered in a following section); 
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• Create greater oversight and additional reporting requirements; and 
• Provide transition opportunities to non-traditional firms to go into 
production following a successful OTA prototype. 
 Yet, one aspect that has remained constant is its temporary authority status.  OTA 
authority has been extended five times since its initial enactment in 1993, with the most 
recent being the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY08. Section 816 
granted a five-year extension through September 30, 2013 (H. R. Rep. No. 110-146, 
2007).  The following provides an OTA legislative history highlighting significant 
changes over the years. 
Before OTA legislation was created, the Packard Commission initiated the 
authority by recommending that DARPA spearhead prototyping efforts according to the 
President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (1986).  The report 
emphasized the significance of building prototypes for all major weapon systems to 
incorporate new technologies that can provide dependable information to mitigate 
development risk.  This report states:  
In general, prototyping and testing in the early stage of R&D should be 
done by the Service that would be the primary user of the resulting system.  
In order to promote the use of prototyping, however, we recommend 
expanding the role of DARPA. 
At present, DARPA conducts research and exploratory development in 
high-risk, high-payoff technologies. DARPA should have the additional 
mission of stimulating a greater emphasis on prototyping in defense 
systems.  It should do this by actually conducting prototype, projects that 
embody technology that might be incorporated in joint programs, or in 
selected Service programs.  On request, it also should assist the Services in 
their own prototyping programs.  The common objective of all of these 
prototyping programs should be to determine to what extent a given new 
technology can improve military capability, and to provide a basis for 
making realistic cost estimates prior to a decision on full-scale 
development.  In short, the prototype program should allow us to fly-and 
know how much it will cost-before we buy. (pp. 20) 
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This recommendation by the Packard Commission for DARPA to assume the 
prototyping initiative was an ideal fit, given the organization’s past successes and unique 
mission orientation.  As noted here: 
DARPA’s primary mission is to foster advanced technologies and systems 
that create “revolutionary” advantages for the US military. Consistent with 
this mission, DARPA is independent from the Military Services and 
pursues generally higher-risk, higher-payoff research and development 
(R&D) projects. DARPA program managers are encouraged to challenge 
existing approaches to warfighting and to seek results rather than just 
explore ideas. Hence, in addition to supporting technology and component 
development, on occasion DARPA funds the integration of large-scale 
“systems of systems” in order to demonstrate “disruptive capabilities.” 
Disruptive capabilities are more than just new technologies; they are 
transformations in operations and strategy enabled by synergistic 
combinations of technologies. (Van Atta et al., 2003, p. S-1) 
As a result, DARPA revised its charter to incorporate, “a greater emphasis on 
prototyping in defense systems by conducting prototype projects… and, on request, assist 
the Military Departments in their own prototyping programs per DoD Directive 5105.41 
dated January 25, 1989” (Memorandum of Law, 1996, p. 2). 
In 1993, Congress officially authorized exclusive and broad authority to DARPA 
to enter into agreements (OTAs) to prototype technologies and weapons systems relevant 
to DoD acquisition and development.  The authority was granted under Section 845 of 
the NDAA FY1994 under Title 10 USC 2371.  OTAs were given a temporary pilot status 
to be conducted for a period of three years.  The authority allowed for an innovative 
approach to be used for DoD projects to acquire technology and innovation where a 
traditional FAR-based procurement method would not be sufficient.   
“Other Transactions” are not subject to the Armed Services Procurement 
Act, FAR, DFARS, or other laws and regulations specific to the 
procurement system, including the statutes codified in title 41, U.S. Code.  
Likewise, laws and regulations governing assistance relationships or 
specific to grants and cooperative agreements are not applicable.  Statutes 
of general applicability, such as title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
are applicable. (Dunn, 1996, p. 35) 
The authority also emphasized competition to the maximum extent practicable. 
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With the success of rapid prototyping experienced by DARPA (See Figure 9), the 
authority was then amended to extend the program for another three years and expand 
usage to military services per Section 804 of NDAA FY97: 
Authority.-The Director of DARPA, Secretary of a military department, or 
any other official designated by the Secretary of Defense may, under the 
authority of section 2371 or title 10, United States Code, carry out 
prototype projects that are directly relevant to weapons or weapons 




Figure 9.   Total number of OTAs awarded and dollars obligated by DARPA, 1994 – 
2001 (From: DARPA Contract Management Office web page, 2001; in Gilliland, 2001, 
p. 27) 
  
In January 1997, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 
Paul Kaminski, introduced the Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative 
(COSSI) as means for DoD to reduce O&S costs by taking innovations developed in the 
commercial sector and inserting them into existing weapon systems, thereby reducing 
DoD R&D costs (See Figure 10) (The Commercial Operations and Support Savings 
Initiative, 2001, p. 1).  OTAs were chosen as the preferred business instrument for COSSI 
programs under Section 804 (Public Law 104-208) to reduce the restrictiveness 
associated with FAR-based contracts that would otherwise preclude commercial firms 
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from participating (Report to Congress on the activities of the DoD Office of Technology 
Transition, 2000, p. 35).  This allowed DoD to tailor agreements with greater flexibility 
toward the treatment of IP and reduced requirements of cost principles to be able to 
access R&D developed by private companies.  An OTA agreement also allowed for 
creative incentives with funding at different phases and on the basis of payable 
milestones where “observable technical events that the contractor and government agree 
in advance will be the basis for incremental payments” (Peters, 1997, p. 48). 
 
Figure 10.   The COSSI Concept (From: The Commercial Operations and Support 
Savings Initiative, 2001, p. 2) 
 
Starting in 1999, the OTA authority evolved as Congress implemented greater 
controls and follow-on production for completed prototypes.  Section 801 (Public Law 
106-65) amended Section 845 to include (1) Comptroller General (CG) review for an 
OTA that exceeded total payments of $5 M in which the CG can examine the records of 
the parties involved; (2) the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) may waive this review 
requirement if it is not in the public interest by notifying Congress; and (3) the CG review 
is limited to no more than three years after final payment is made.  This legislative 
change came after an Inspector General Audit Report (1999) calling for greater OT 
guidance with emphasis on the reporting of independent research and development 
(IR&D) costs.  The Inspector General asserted the $60.2 M in IR&D costs (i.e., 72  
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percent of discrepant costs identified) should not be treated as a share of a company’s in 
accordance with Director, Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E) nonmandatory 
guidance (pp. i-ii, 12). 
For NDAA FY2001, Section 803 (Public Law 106-398) was enacted adding 
further requirement that (1) at least a non-traditional defense contractor participates in a 
significant extent on an OTA, or (2) must contribute to a 1/3 cost-share requirement, or 
(3) receives a special procurement exception determination justifying the use of an OTA.  
It also defined a “non-traditional defense contractor” as: 
An entity that has not, for a period of at least one year prior to the date that 
a transaction (other than a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement) for a 
prototype project under the authority of this section is entered into or 
performed with respect to-- 
(1) any contract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting 
standards prescribed pursuant to section 26 of the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy Act (41 USC 422) and the regulations implementing 
such section; or 
(2) any other contract in excess of $500,000 to carry out prototype projects 
or to perform basic, applied, or advanced research projects for a Federal 
agency, that is subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation. (Public Law 
106-398, Section 803) 
In December 2001, Congress supported amending the OTA prototyping authority 
by passing Section 822 (Public Law 107-107), which would provide firms the ability to 
transition into a production contract following successful prototyping efforts from an 
OTA arrangement by exempting competition requirements.  This was in response to DoD 
and industry who “have repeatedly requested that we [Congress] extend OTA to 
production contracts” ever since the authority was first established (Army Transformation 
and Future Combat System, 2005, Body section, para. 10).  However, the new legislation 
required that certain conditions to be met: (1) competitive procedures were used in the 
selection process of the OTA; (2) prototyping project was completed; and (3) a 
predetermined number of units, along with pre-specified target price in the follow-on  
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production, adhered to the terms and conditions of the original OTA.  A concern 
regarding this new language was incorporated into a 2004 Code of Federal Regulations as 
proposed by DoD, which states: 
Limitation. As a matter of policy, establishing target prices for production 
units should only be considered when the risk of the prototype project 
permits realistic production pricing without placing undue risks on the 
awardee. (Transactions Other Than Contracts, Grants, or Cooperative 
Agreements, 2004, pp. 20-21)  
As a result, DoD and the contractor must accurately project and come to terms 
with a number of issues regarding the production of a successfully completed prototype 
to adequately predict quantity and price in the OTA agreement.  These issues include, but 
are not limited to, predetermining an acceptable level of risk by all parties in the 
arrangement and projecting future funding requirements in order to be programmed for 
the procurement of goods.  This would be difficult for agreement officers to ascertain, 
since standard contract requirements such as cost or pricing data are not mandated due to 
the nature of OTAs. 
Two years later, Congress passed Section 847 (Public Law 108-136) authorizing 
the Secretary of Defense to create a five-year pilot program to extend transition 
opportunities for production to non-traditional contractors with a firm, fixed price type 
contract not to exceed $50 million.  This production item would be procured 
commercially per the Office of Federal Procurement Act, Section 4(12) (H.R. 1588, 
2006).  The pilot program was then incorporated as DFARS Subpart 212.70.  However, 
the amended authority did not address or resolve the requirements for predetermined 
price and quantity established previously in Section 822. 
Section 823 (Public Law 109-163) of NDAA FY06 added greater oversight to 
OTAs by modifying the authority to require a determination in writing by the senior 
procurement executive for the agency if the DoD project cost exceeds $20 million, or by 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics if projects 
costs exceed $100 million with the requirement to notify Congress at least 30 days in 
advance prior to entering into the award. 
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This modification was in direct response to what Congress deemed an 
inappropriate use of the OTA authority in the multi-billion dollar Future Combat System 
(FCS) Acquisition between the Army and Boeing company.  Provided below is Senator 
McCain’s statement at a Senate subcommittee hearing that the FCS weapons program 
does not meet Congress’ intent of OTAs: 
…We've [Congress] taken the view that with hundreds of millions of 
dollars, or even billions of dollars, at stake, the taxpayer needs the 
protections built into the traditional procurement system. And I'd be glad 
to hear from the witnesses if they think there's something wrong with the 
traditional procurement system and if it needs to be modernized or 
updated. 
While we recognize that there may be need for continuing doing business 
with non-traditional contractors in the production phase of a program, we 
prefer to address this issue through targeted waivers that are limited to 
those companies who need them. Now the Army has put forward a 
program that uses Other Transaction Authority for a $20 billion contract— 
a figure much greater than the Congress intended, and unprecedented. 
(Army Transformation and Future Combat System, 2005, Body section, 
paras. 9-10) 
2.  Non DoD-Related Legislation 
The authority to conduct “Other Transactions” has been granted to other 
Government departments and agencies.  Table 4 shows these organizations with this 
authority, detailing the originating authority along with their purpose for the “Other 
Transaction” Authority.  The purposes for utilizing “Other Transaction” can range from 
specific to very broad in order to achieve their respective goal or objectives.  The DHS 
was also afforded the authority to conduct prototype development via OTAs similar to 






Table 4.   List of Government Organizations and Respective Authority to Conduct 
Certain “Other Transactions” 
Government Organization Authority to Enter into an 
"Other Transaction" 
Purpose 
NASA NASA Space Act of 1958, 
Sections 203c and 205 
In the conduct of its work 
DoT  DoT and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, Section 308 
In execution of the Technology 
Reinvestment Project authorized under the 
Defense Conversion, Reinvestment and 




Reauthorization Act 1996, 
Section 226 
Agency Objectives to include construction 
DoT  Transportation Equity Act for 
the Twenty-First Century 
enacted June 1998, Section 5506 
R&D efforts for the development of the 
Advanced Vehicle Technologies Program.  
(Did not specify OTA type) 
DHS Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
Section 831 
Prototype Development 
Head of any executive 
agency may enter into an 
OTA (and TIA) with OMB 
approval 
FY2004 NDAA, Section 1441 Prototype Development for the purpose to 
defend against or recover from nuclear, 
biological, chemical or radiological attack 
 
E.  ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS IN ADDITION TO OTA 
Other non-FAR based methods also exist for prototyping development available to 
the Federal Government.  These options, as discussed below, similarly entail flexible 
treatment of IP aspects, which encourages non-traditional participation. Unlike OTA 
authority, which is an alternative procurement tool, these alternatives are Government-
managed programs.  The first two, the Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) and 
Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR), are dedicated small business set-asides.  
The third is a venture type model originally developed by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) that seeks innovative solutions for a specific agency, which may afford it 
in prototype development form.  The following discussion provides general information 
on these three programs. 
Created under the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-
219), the SBIR Program is directed at small business concerns through set-asides to 
encourage innovation and meet R&D needs for the Government (Office of Extramural 
Research Website, 2007, para. 1).  STTR was established in 1992 by Congress and funds 
 35
cooperative R&D projects between a small business and research institution for the 
purpose of “transferring” research ideas to market (DoD SBIR/STTR Overview, 2008, 
para. 7).  Under the DoD model, both programs are evaluated and funded in three phases 
for potential prototype development and commercial development (See Table 5).4 
 
Table 5.   SBIR/STTR 3-Phase Approach with Funding Amounts and Timelines 
(From: DoD SBIR/STTR Overview, 2008) 
 
 
SBIRs and STTRs are both similar and dissimilar to OTAs in certain aspects.  
Unlike OTAs, SBIR/STTR apply only to firms that meet the “U.S. for-profit small 
business of 500 or fewer employees” criteria, thereby excluding medium- and large-sized 
firms such as commercial industry leaders (Ibid., paras 4, 8).  There are also funding caps 
on each project to not exceed $850,000, whereas approval levels are required for OTAs in 
excess of $20 million and $100 million per NDAA FY06 legislation.  However, these 
programs are similar to the OTA multi-phase approach where they are competed initially 
(submission prior to Phase I) and during the phases (winners are screened and selected in 
Phase I for project feasibility and then again at Phase II for project development for 
prototype).   
                                                 
4 There are currently 11 government organizations that must participate in the SBIR program: 
Department of Agriculture, DoC, DoD, Department of Education, Department of Energy, Department of 
Health and Human Services, DHS, DoT, Environmental Protection Agency, NASA, National Science 
Foundation.  The STTR program has six participating agencies: DoD, Department of Energy, Department 
of Health and Human Services, NASA, and National Science Foundation.  (SBA SBIR/STTR Program 
Description, 2001, paras. 5, 16).  The way SBIR and STTRs are managed and executed may vary between 
the agencies.  (SBA SBIR/STTR PowerPoint Overview, 2001, slide 15)  DoD projects appear to focus on 
prototyping efforts. 
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Some individuals have expressed concern regarding the use of the SBIR program.  
In a testimony by Phyllis Gardner (2003) on behalf of the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,  she contends there is a 
problem qualifying for SBIR where a firm must be at least 51 percent owned by 
“individuals” (to mean only natural persons) who are U.S. citizens.  Start-up firms who 
receive most of their funding from venture capitalists may not be eligible for SBIR 
funding, and this is the case for most start-up biotechnology companies (Moving 
Research from the Bench to the Bedside, p. 4).  Another issue is the strict Small Business 
Administration requirement of 500 employees necessary to qualify for SBIR during the 
time of award.  This would disqualify many firms that fluctuate around that number of 
employment who can provide innovative R&D to the Government.  A contracting officer 
at a medium-sized firm shared in the frustration that since their company employment 
numbers would change at any time they could become ineligible for the funding, but 
knew their company could provide unique technological solutions to DoD. 
Though used to discover specific technologies under the CIA’s In-Q-Tel Model, 
the “venture catalyst” model also provides the opportunity for prototyping outside the 
FAR.  Established in July 1999, this model applies Federal funding in the form of a 
strategic investment (up to $5 million per company) through a non-profit organization 
established by a governmental organization to discover specific technologies in the 
private sector and accelerate them to provide solutions to the CIA (Molzahn, 2003, pp. 
47, 49-50).   
The research and prototyping efforts vary by agency needs.  The original model, 
In-Q-Tel, was created to provide critical information technology applications to the CIA 
(Ibid., p. 48).  For the Army, OnPoint Technologies was “the result of Section 8150 of 
Public Law 107-117, the National Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002 
which, set aside funding for a Venture Capital Initiative” focused on Mobile Power and 
Energy Enabling Technologies (OnPoint Technologies History, para 1).  In 2006, NASA 
was the third governmental organization to be granted the venture capital authority.  Its 
Red Planet invests in start-up firms in order to promote innovation that will enable 
“returning astronauts to the moon by 2020 and potentially sending them to Mars” 
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(Kaufman, 2006, para 8).  Note that according to its website, the Red Planet program has 
been renamed Astrolab Ventures, to now include investments in Europe (Astrolab 
Ventures: The Fund, para 1). 
The “venture catalyst” approach is quite unique and different from the standard 
acquisition process.  According to Yannuzzi (2000), the In-Q-Tel Model is fashioned 
after OTs to meet the CIA’s unique criteria: 
Before the partnership between In-Q-Tel and the Agency became a reality, 
the Agency had to develop a new contract vehicle that granted the 
Corporation the degrees of freedom it needed to operate in the market 
place.  Most Agency contracts, including those in R&D, are based on the 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). However, the FAR is often 
viewed by industry as overly burdensome and inflexible. And, it has been 
the Department of Defense’s (DoD) experience that smaller companies 
often will not contract with the government because of the extra costs they 
would incur to be FAR-compliant. Because the Agency wanted to 
encourage such companies to work with In-Q-Tel, it took a different 
approach and designed a non-FAR agreement with the Corporation. It 
adopted elements from a DARPA model based on OT authority granted to 
the DoD by Congress.  OT agreements permit authorized government 
agencies to design R&D agreements outside the FAR (ch. 6). 
In addition, the model allows all sorts of business arrangements commonly found 
in commercial industry to facilitate creating the relationships with small companies who 
can provide the R&D solutions.  They include joint ventures, sponsor competitions, sole 
source contracts, etc. (Yannuzzi, ch. 2).  Lastly, there is no agency approval for any of the 
business arrangements under In-Q-Tel (Ibid., ch. 2). 
The operational model is depicted in Figure 11, which shows the general process 
of defining the need, searching for an industry solution, investing in technologies, and 
testing the technologies to determine additional funding for prototyping or pilot program 
for potential commercial development.  Throughout this process, In-Q-Tel advises the 
firm on potential commercialization of its products (Ibid., p. 51).   
 38
 
Figure 11.   In-Q-Tel Model (From: Molzahn, 2003, p. 51) 
 
For the “venture catalyst” model, the same limitation exists as with SBIRs and 
STTRs.  These programs primarily address small start-ups that desire the capital and 
relationships for specific solutions to the respective organization providing the funding.  
The model excludes large and medium firms, including those who are leaders in industry 
with proven products and capabilities.   
F.  SUMMARY  
This chapter reviews previous OTA studies, but finds that their approaches differ 
significantly from this research.  The focus of previous studies deals primarily with 
determining if OTAs have met Congressional intent and on analysis of OTA benefits and 
limitations.  Of some relevant interest is Gilliland’s thesis (2001) that asked if the 
relationships established by OTAs “opened the door” for follow-on business with DoD.  
But, Gilliland did not distinguish what follow-on work resulted from the OTA.  Further, 
one cannot determine if the prototype resulted in additional work from DoD (e.g., 
additional contract or OTA), or led to direct production opportunities stemming from the 
specific completed OTA project.   
Additionally, this chapter provides a macro analysis of the defense industry to 
demonstrate the advantages large defense contractors have enjoyed with industry 
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consolidation and the special relationships illustrated in the “iron triangle.”  Legislative 
history on OTAs shows the authority and significant changes over time as amended by 
Congress, and emphasizes that the OTA authority has been extended outside DoD to 
other agencies.  Finally, this chapter presents non-FAR based alternatives to prototyping 
in addition to the OTA authority. 
The next chapter will examine the available opportunities in order for a completed 
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III. TRANSITION OPPORTUNITIES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
For “traditional” defense contractors, transitioning a completed prototype for 
follow-on production can be accomplished under FAR Part 15 (Contracting by 
Negotiation) since they are already accustomed, structured, and have the capacity to 
operate within existing FAR Part 15 protocols.  However, “non-traditional” firms that are 
small or commercial in nature would find difficulty in complying with applicable 
standard procurement regulations.  In doing so, non-traditional firms most likely would 
incur additional structure and cost requirements that would adversely affect profitability.  
For example, W.L. Gore & Associates (the advanced material developer and 
manufacturer of Gore-Tex) had conducted an internal survey to see how much it would 
cost to become CAS compliant because of certain materials innovations they believed 
could benefit both the DoD and DoE; however, they decided not to do business with the 
Government because it would be too costly (Anonymous, personal communication, 
March 27, 2008).   The non-traditional firm could also transition the completed prototype 
with the assistance of another firm (e.g., traditional defense contractor), but this would 
result in having to potentially share sensitive, proprietary technical data that may 
compromise the competitive advantage of the non-traditional firm.  
To bypass standard procurement requirements as well as alleviate intellectual 
property (IP) concerns, there are certain legislative provisions and regulations in the FAR 
and DFARS that provide opportunities for non-traditional firms and DoD to extend a 
prototype to additional follow-on work in production or services.  This chapter looks at 
these different transitioning opportunities available to non-traditional firms.   The 
Rosettex Technology & Ventures Group and CBRTA models apply an integrated and 
structured approach to OTA prototyping with opportunities to transition through the use 
of partnerships and strategic alliance that are also examined. 
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B.  TRANSITION OPPORTUNITIES UNDER FAR & DFARS 
1.  DFARS Subpart 212.70-Pilot Program for Transition to Follow-On 
Contracting after Use of Other Transaction Authority  
As was mentioned in the Legislative History section of Chapter II, Congress 
realized the importance of insufficient transitioning opportunities to non-traditional firms 
who had developed prototype weapons systems under an OTA.   Congress enacted 
legislation in 2001 to provide follow-on production opportunities to non-traditional firms 
by exempting competition requirements that normally presumed in standard contracts, 
but with conditional requirements.  These requirements are:  
• Competitive procedures used in the OTA selection process, 
• A completed prototype project, and 
• A predetermined number of units with pre-specified target price for the 
production phase to be agreed to as part of terms and conditions of the 
original OTA agreement. 
The rationale behind this legislation is that once the competition was completed 
with the awarding of an OTA, having the quantities and prices established up front would 
result in no further need to re-compete into transition for production phase.  Therefore, 
full and open competition may exist at the beginning of the OTA process, but 
unnecessary in the production phase as FAR procurement statutes do not apply.  
In 2003, Congress amended this legislation and authorized the Secretary of 
Defense to create a pilot program for non-traditional contractors to transition an OTA 
prototype into production under a fixed price type contract not to exceed $50 million.  
DoD later incorporated this into regulation as DFARS Subpart 212.70, which allowed for 
greater flexibility toward the treatment of technical data rights on the basis of satisfying 
agency needs (DFARS, 2008). 
2.  FAR Part 12-Acquisition of Commercial Items 
With the potential for certain OTA projects meeting dual-use purpose (both 
defense and commercial application), the developed prototype may achieve commercial 
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item criteria5 and can be procured under FAR Part 12.6   FAR Part 12 is ideal for non-
traditional firms in transitioning a prototype for production because the CAS requirement 
is not applicable while technical data rights of the prototype are treated as commercial 
items provided to the public (FAR, 2008).  However, market pricing must be available to 
establish “fair and reasonable” price.   
The challenges of establishing market price for a completed OTA project is 
illustrated in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Program that was 
intended for potential commercial service acquisition via FAR Part 12 (Mazur, 2003, p. 
11).  The EELV program goals were to develop a more affordable expendable launch 
capability by reducing recurring launch costs by 25 percent (Saxer, Knauf, Drake, & 
Portanova, 2002, p. 2).  To help achieve this, a dual use approach was used to develop 
EELV for both the military and the projected commercial application resulting in an OTA 
award to facilitate a shared R&D effort (one-third of this cost was funded by the 
contractors) and a fixed price type contracts for commercial services delivery order 
contracts to two contractors (Ibid., 2002, pp. 6-7; Mazur, 2003, p. 11).  The EELV 
program achieved successful launch demonstrations in “a little more than five years after 
award of the other transactions and well within the traditional seven-year space system 
development time line” (Mazur, 2003, p. 11).  However, the commercial aspect was 
never realized due to the following: 
Initial plans for the EELV program projected a much more robust 
commercial launch market. However, the decline in the commercial 
launch market since the late 1990s significantly reduced the anticipated 
number of Atlas V and Delta IV launches, making the government the 
primary customer for both launch vehicles. This reduction, in turn, caused 
anticipated prices for government launch services to increase significantly. 
(Defense acquisitions: Assessments of major weapon programs, 2004, p. 
53) 
                                                 
5 FAR Part 2 defines a commercial item as “any item, other than real property, that is of a type 
customarily used by the general public or by non-governmental entities for purposes other than 
governmental purposes, and— (i) Has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public; or (ii) Has been 
offered for sale, lease, or license to the general public.”  Additional criteria for commercial items can be 
found in FAR Subpart 2.1. 
6 FAR Part 12 was established by Public Law 103-355 (FASA, 1994) to create special requirements for 
the acquisition of commercial items.   
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As a result, the Air Force had to revise the EELV acquisition strategy with cost-
plus-award-fee contracts in 2006 (Defense acquisitions: Assessments of selected major 
weapon programs, 2008, p. 76). 
3. FAR Subpart 13.5-Test Program for Certain Commercial Items 
Subpart 13.5 authorizes the use of Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) for 
supplies and services greater than the simplified acquisition threshold but not to exceed 
$5.5 million with the same procedures in acquiring commercial items as required in FAR 
Part 12.  Again, CAS is not applicable and the commercial aspect toward technical data 
rights is relevant.  So, if a non-traditional firm can prototype with dual-use purpose and 
then be competed under SAP, then the follow-on production would not be subject to CAS 
requirements with reasonable protection of data rights to the firm. 
4.  FAR Subpart 37.2-Advisory and Assistance Services 
The researchers identified a section of the FAR that may provide potential DoD 
follow-on business opportunities for non-traditional defense companies.  This section is 
referred to as Advisory and Assistance Services (AAS) per FAR Subpart 37.2, which 
authorizes companies to provide professional advice or assistance services that may be 
relevant to the technical and engineering aspects of relevant or similar weapon system 
programs.  AAS is defined in the FAR as: 
Those services provided under contract by nongovernmental sources to 
support or improve: organizational policy development; decision-making; 
management and administration; program and/or project management and 
administration; or R&D activities.  It can also mean the furnishing of 
professional advice or assistance rendered to improve the effectiveness of 
Federal management processes or procedures (including those of an 
engineering and technical nature). In rendering the foregoing services, 
outputs may take the form of information, advice, opinions, alternatives, 
analyses, evaluations, recommendations, training and the day-to-day aid of 
support personnel needed for the successful performance of ongoing 
Federal operations. (FAR, 2008) 
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C.  UNIQUE MODELS UTILIZING OTA-CBRTA AND ROSETTEX 
MODELS 
CBRTA and Rosettex are two unique approaches that incorporate the OTA 
authority to access commercial technologies to provide the Government the best possible 
innovative solutions on behalf of the National Technology Alliance (NTA).7  Both were 
awarded a procurement agreement by the NGA (executive agent of the NTA) to address 
certain technological needs.  For CBRTA, it focused on chemical, biological and 
radiological aspects.  As for Rosettex, those areas are geospatial intelligence, information 
processing, analysis and management, and digital technology infrastructure (National 
Technology Alliance, 2006, pp. 2-3).  The OTA agreement provides “streamlined and 
rapid contracting…less than 30 days from draft SOW to being on contract is not unusual” 
(About CBRTA Members, 2008, p. 2). 
The processes incorporated by each model vary significantly, but may lead to 
production opportunities.  The CBRTA model incorporates a two-process approach, 
which are Independent Assessment and Evaluation, and Technology Research, 
Development and Prototyping Activities and Special Studies (OTA Agreement between 
CBRTA and NGA, 2007, p. 10). 
In the past, the CBRTA program effectively leveraged the OTA authority to other 
Governmental agencies (e.g., Center for Disease Control, Environmental Protection 
Agency, etc.) for conducting CBR-related R&D and prototyping (L. Clarke, personal 
communication, April 9, 2008).  This enabled various Governmental agencies that do not 
possess the OTA authority to access the processes of acquiring commercial technologies 
under an established structure. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The NTA was created as an intelligence community program to provide the government access to 
technologies from commercial industry focusing on dual-use technology where cost-sharing can be attained 
(National Technology Alliance, 2006, pp. 1-2). 
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Under an OTA agreement, the CBRTA incorporates a strategic alliance approach 
consisting of 13 companies 8  dedicated to developing and enhancing commercial 
technologies by leveraging existing IR&D from these companies (National Technology 
Alliance, 2006, p. 3).  The companies perform specialized functions such as concept 
development, R&D, product integration, production, and so forth.  With product 
development and commercialization function, the transition opportunity exists under FAR 
Part 12 and Subpart 13.5.   
Like CBRTA, the Rosettex process involves two distinct processes: it first 
focusing on an extensive evaluation and assessment effort; and it then transitions to the 
next process which consists of “prototyping (via an OTA agreement), product 
development, commercialization, technology insertion, and systems integration” (Ibid., p. 
2).  This process is also relevant to partnerships with various industry and academic 
partners to include traditional and non-traditional firms (See Table 6).  According to its 
website, Rosettex “manages a team of more than 75 leading information technology (IT) 
organizations seeking solutions to the U.S. Government’s diverse and demanding IT 
needs” (Rosettex Website: About, 2008). 
D.  SUMMARY 
This chapter provides potential options available to transition a prototype to 
production or follow-on services.  Two different models incorporating OTA authority are 
also presented.  The CBRTA and Rosettex approaches provide rapid and streamlined 
processes to obtain innovative technologies from the commercial industry.  With these 
different transition opportunities identified, the researchers can apply this information to 
the survey and interview questions.  The questions and surveys are discussed in Chapter 
IV. 
 
                                                 
8 Members include BD Technologies, Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp., CUBRC Inc., Cargill 
Inc., General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems, Honeywell International Inc., John Hopkins 
University Applied Physics Laboratory, LGS Innovations LLC, 3M Company, RAE LLC, Syracuse 
Research Corporation, and Cipher Systems (OTA Agreement between CBRTA and NGA, 2007, pp. 2-5). 
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Table 6.   Rosettex Partners Segregated by Process Function (From: Rosettex 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The intent of the current OTA legislation focus is to attract non-traditional firms 
to participate in prototype weapon systems with new technologies that improve capability 
and reduce life-cycle costs, along with providing opportunities to transition to production. 
Therefore, it is important to analyze the experiences from firms that have conducted OTA 
agreements with the DoD to improve the business environment. In the meantime, the 
transitioning opportunities are examined to further understand the obstacles faced by 
participants.  This study seeks to understand what clauses in the OTA legislation and 
statutes attract these firms to conduct business with the Government.  More importantly, 
the study seeks to discover what can be done by the Government to improve business 
conditions and bring commercial technology into the military.  
This chapter is intended to answer the following research questions:  
• To what extent have transition opportunities been made available to and 
utilized by non-traditional firms to extend their completed prototype under 
the OTA to DoD production? 
• What aspects of the OTA attract the non-traditional firms to do business 
with the Government? 
• What are the transitioning opportunities experienced by the non-traditional 
firms that have conducted OTA agreements? 
• What are the transitioning opportunities available and used by DoD 
officials? 
• What are the barriers, if any, encountered by the non-traditional firms that 








Electronic surveys (See Appendix C) were conducted on a sample set of 
firms that have utilized OTAs to assess the OTA program’s efficacy and to also 
determine if follow-on production opportunities were afforded after the completion of the 
OTA. The questionnaire was developed after an extensive literature review of previous 
relevant OTA studies.  The researchers used a self-administered, online survey approach 
to collect data.  The pretest survey was reviewed for content by three DoD contracting 
officials, with two having broad knowledge and experience on OTAs.  Feedback from 
pretest respondents was used to modify and clarify the wording and format of the survey 
items. 
The researchers did not have direct information of each company’s 
officials who entered into OTA agreement with the DoD.  To contact these individuals, 
the researchers obtained points of contact via the companies’ public relations phone lists 
or submitted e-mail requests through their websites.  Once contact information was 
obtained, the researchers called or e-mailed these company officials and asked them to 
complete the survey.  In some very successful instances, the researchers asked for further 
information beyond the survey, such as providing greater insight on their respective 
experiences, which are presented in Section E.  The individuals were given more than 
two weeks to complete the survey.   
The survey was designed to allow the respondents the opportunity to 
answer freely where answers to the survey questions were optional and could be omitted 
at the respondents’ discretion.  The multiple choice questions provided for a “non-
applicable” answer option if none of the existing choices met their intent.  Besides, the 
survey ensured anonymity; therefore, the respondents could feel free to answer these 
questions without being identified or subject to possible retribution for any comments 
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provided.  Though some respondents had called or e-mailed back to clarify some of their 
questions or answers, the researchers protected their anonymity. 
Survey questions 1 and 2 were designed to acquire demographic 
information of the respondents.  Survey questions 3-5 were designed to identify what 
functions in the OTA attracted the non-traditional firms to do business with the 
Government.  Survey questions 6-7 were designed to determine if a competitive 
environment existed for the respondent’s OTA.  Survey questions 8-10 were designed to 
identify what transitioning opportunities available under FAR and DFARS were 
considered by the non-traditional firms, while question 13 was designed to know what 
other follow-on plans the respondents had besides producing for DoD.  Survey questions 
11-12 were designed to identify what the DoD approach toward transitioning the OTA.  
Lastly, survey questions 14-15 were designed to identify their satisfaction level toward 
the OTA experience and other observations not covered in the survey. 
b. Interview 
Interviews were conducted to understand the transitioning opportunities 
and issues perceived by DoD officials and consultants.  Methods of face-to-face 
interviews, telephone interview, and email correspondence were used.  The researchers 
requested to conduct interview with three DoD officials and two consultants, all having 
broad experience and knowledge in OTAs.   
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with three DoD officials because 
of their broad knowledge and experience in contracting and OTA-related matters.  
Telephone interviews with email correspondence were conducted with two Government 
consultants.  The questionnaire was developed after an extensive literature review of 
previous relevant OTA studies.  The interviewees were sent a copy of the interview 
questions via e-mail in advance of the interview.  The interviewees enjoyed complete 
discretion as to which of the questions they would answer. 
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c. Other Insights Provided 
In the course of soliciting general information on OTAs and initiating 
survey or interview requests from DoD and industry, certain individuals provided 
information in phone conversations, and consented to having the information transcribed 
to be included into this research thesis.  The information is presented as “Other Insights 
Provided” in Section E of this chapter. 
2. Participants 
a. Survey 
To analyze the transitioning opportunities for non-traditional firms, a 
survey was conducted on firms who have conducted OT agreements in recent years. The 
researchers selected firms that entered into agreement from FY2001-FY2005 since 
previous research (Gilliland, 2001) has conducted survey on companies that entered into 
agreements with DoD from FY1994-FY2000. For the purposes of this research, the non-
traditional firms identified as potential candidates for survey included both the prime and 
partner companies since privity of contracts is not relevant to OTA as traditional FAR-
based contracts. The 2007 LMI report classified 124 companies as non-traditional on new 
prototype awards on the basis of Reports to Congress (FY01-FY05) and with their 
professional judgment (pp. E8-E14).  Of the 124 companies listed in the LMI report, only 
79 firms were contacted via phone contact or email.  Some companies could not be 
contacted because they had either been acquired by other firms, contact information was 
unavailable, or the names provided were too general and could not be narrowed to a 
specific firm.  Another seven non-traditional firms from the CBRTA who also conducted 
OTA work during this timeframe were contacted.   
The number of survey responses reached a total of 15.  The response rate 
is 17 percent.  Self-administered surveys typically have a relatively low response rate, 
often less than 30 percent (Ruane, 2005, p. 124). The reasons for a low response rate 
were companies elected not to participate in the survey; and survey did not reach 
companies’ contracting officials. 
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b. Interview 
Questions & Answers were derived from interviews between one OSD 
Senior Contracting Staff [SC]; two DoD officials experienced in OTAs [DO]; John 
Ablard [JA], Senior Research Fellow at LMI;9 and Lawrence Clarke [LC], Program 
Support Manager for the National Technology Alliance’s CBRTA.10  The DoD and OSD 
officials requested their names and organization affiliation to be excluded for this 
research and that they be identified by the respective acronyms mentioned above.  The 
face-to-face interview with the two DoD officials [DO] was conducted on March 26, 
2008.  The phone interviews and email correspondence with Mr. Ablard [JA] were 
conducted on April 2, 2008, and with Mr. Clarke [LC] on April 8, 2008.   
C. SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS 
1. Demographic Information 
To understand the business background of the respondents, the first two survey 
questions were designed to determine both the size and type of their business.  Question 1 
asked: 
“How would you characterize the size of your business?” 
All respondents answered this question, and the results are displayed in Table 7.  
The business size may have affected the company’s desire and willingness to conduct 
business with the Government.  Fourteen of the fifteen respondents identified themselves 
as a small company; the remaining respondent categorized the business as a medium-
sized company. 
The type of business is an important factor in understanding the survey results, 
since the intent of this survey is to understand the transition opportunities for non-
traditional firms.  The second survey question asked respondents to categorize the type of 
their business with multiple answers and free input allowed.  Question 2 asked: 
                                                 
9 See Appendix D for Mr. Abelard’s personal biography. 
10 See Appendix E for Mr. Clarke’s personal biography. 
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“What is the nature of your firm's business?” 
All respondents answered this question and the answers are displayed in Table 7.  
Thirteen of the respondents identified themselves as non-traditional defense companies 
(excluding the two respondents who answered traditional defense contractors).  Also, 
more than one-quarter of the respondents were in the business of private research.  The 
two respondents who categorized themselves as traditional defense contractors did so 
even though the researchers used academic sound judgment to define non-traditionals.  
This may be due to the definition provided by legislation of what a “non-traditional” 
contractor is.  The researchers believe that the original definition of a non-traditional 
contractor from Congress as codified in Title 10 USC 2371 presents a narrow 
interpretation, as stated below: 
A business unit that has not, for a period of at least one year prior to the 
date of the OT agreement, entered into or performed on (1) any contract 
that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards 
prescribed pursuant to section 26 of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 422) and the regulations implementing such section; 
or (2) any other contract in excess of $500,000 to carry out prototype 
projects or to perform basic, applied, or advanced research projects for a 
Federal agency that is subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (OT 
Guide, 2000, p.7).    
Nonetheless, the survey had successfully attracted non-traditional defense 
companies to participate in this survey.  The survey results are believed to represent the 
majority of the non-traditional (including commercial and small) companies who entered 








Table 7.   Demographic Information of the Respondents 
Size of Business Counts Percentage 
Small 14 93% 
Medium 1 7% 
Large 0 0% 
Total 15 100% 
Type of Business (multiple responses allowed) 
Non-Traditional Defense Contractor 8 53% 
Commercial 9 60% 
Private Research 4 27% 
Traditional Defense Contractor 2 13% 
Non-Profit/Not for Profit 0 0% 
  
2. Reasons for Entering into an OTA 
So what brings these non-traditional firms to enter into OTA agreements with the 
DoD?  Competitive procedures shall be used in carrying out these OTA agreements, but 
FAR-based procurement rules do not apply.  To find out what motivates respondents to 
conduct business with the DoD, the researchers developed survey question 3, which 
asked: 
“How was the OTA initiated?” 
All respondents answered this question, with the results displayed in Figure 12.  
Almost 50 percent of the OTAs were in response to DoD solicitations.  Interestingly, one-
third of the OTA agreements were approached by DoD proactively.  More surprisingly, 
13 percent of the respondents were allowed to promote their innovative ideas to DoD.  
This is a very important aspect of OTA, which exposes the Government to a greater range 
of opportunities to cutting-edge technologies where innovation is “pushed” beyond what 
is being sought by DoD. 
The non-traditional firms approached by the researchers also include the partner 
firms (sub-contractors).  Therefore, one respondent (7 percent) answered that it was 
approached by the prime contractors to take part in the OTA project.  Unlike the standard 
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role of subcontractor, this aspect of OTA potentially allows the non-traditional firms to 
participate to a significant degree since they are a potential source of innovative ideas. 
Responded to DoD 
solicitation, 47%





Figure 12.   Initiation of the OTA 
 
The non-traditional firms would not do business with the Government without 
some lucrative incentive or rationale.  To know what attracts these companies to enter 
such agreements, survey question four was designed to find out the reasons behind it.  
Question 4 asked: 
“What was the PRIMARY incentive for entering into the OTA with DoD?” 
All respondents answered this question and the results are displayed in Figure 13.  
More than 50 percent of the respondents said the biggest incentive was to bypass onerous 
Federal regulations.  The next primary incentives selected by the respondents were the 
availability of Government funding and the IP rights consideration.  The last primary 
incentive was the potential further business with the DoD, which was selected by one 
respondent (7 percent).  
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Potential for Further 











Figure 13.   Primary Incentive for Entering into OTA 
 
The results of this survey question coincide with a general belief that OTA gives 
DoD the opportunity to streamline the procurement process by using innovative 
commercial business practices as reported in RAND, GAO reports, etc.  Such instruments 
also provide the DoD with the opportunity to broaden its technology and industrial base, 
fostering new relationship and, in turn, supporting national security strategy. 
Upon determining the primary incentive that attracts non-traditional firms to enter 
into OTA agreements, it also worth finding out what their other (secondary) incentives 
are.   Survey question 5 asked: 
“What were OTHER incentives for conducting business with the DoD?” 
All respondents answered this question with the answers displayed in Table 8.  
This question allowed respondents to provide multiple answers.  The rationale for this 
question was to find out what are the secondary incentives in attracting these non-
traditional firms to conduct business with the DoD.  The ranking of these other incentives 
should not be the same as the primary incentives.  The No. 1 secondary incentives that 
 58
most respondents chose were availability of Government funding, and potential for 
further business with DoD, with each chosen by 60 percent of the respondents.   
It is understandable that a company’s primary objective is to maximize profit.  
Therefore, companies that normally do not conduct business with the Government would 
be willing to develop new business relationship if the Government could streamline the 
acquisition process by eliminating certain burdensome regulations.  The perception of 
onerous Federal regulations was shown to be the main reason (Figure 13) why many non-
traditional firms are unwilling to do business.  And since OTAs help steamline 
acquisition, the non-traditional firms would now consider conducting business with the 
DoD since it creates opportunities for funding, and potential business with DoD for those 
firms where the possibilities were limited or did not exist prior to the OTA arrangement.   
 
Table 8.   Other Incentives for Entering into OTA 
 Other Incentives Counts Percentage 
Availability of Government Funding 9 60% 
Potential for Further Business with 
DoD 9 60% 
IP Rights Consideration 5 33% 
Bypass Onerous Federal Regulations 3 20% 
Ability to Subcontract to Non-
Traditionals 1 7% 
 
3. Competitive Requirement 
Agreement officers and program managers are encouraged to use competitive 
procedures when entering into prototype agreements, per DoD’s OT Guide for Prototype 
Projects (2000).  To evaluate if competition is an aspect encountered by non-traditional 
firms, researchers asked questions to determine if the OTAs were competed, and, if so, 
how they were competed.  This is an important aspect of OTAs since competition may 
exist when requests (Broad Agency Announcements) are initially publicized to attract 
potential firms, and also during the OTA process if there is sufficient competition to 
evaluate the program at three phases: Concept Definition, System Development, and 
Transition to Service. 
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To understand how many of the OTA were competed, survey question 6 asked: 
“Were any of the OTAs competed?” 
All but one respondent answered this question.  The answers are displayed in 
Table 9.  More than 85 percent of the respondents answered that the OTAs were 
competed.  This high competitiveness rate suggests that OTAs are attracting competition 
from non-traditional firms (and even traditional defense contractors) to participate.  This 
benefits DoD since increased competition can provide better results with the prototyped 
weapons systems, and better pricing of the awards with more participation. 
With the survey results showing 86 percent of the OTA as competed, it was of 
interest to the researchers to find out if those OTAs were competed and evaluated at 
various incremental stages.  Analyzing such information would help readers to 
understand the degree of competitiveness during the development of prototype.  Survey 
question 7 asked: 
“Were the OTAs competed and evaluated at various incremental stages?” 
The results are also displayed in Table 9 (shaded area).  All the 12 respondents 
who answered “Yes” in the previous survey question answered this follow-on question 
with the results showing that 50 percent of all respondents (less the one respondent who 
skipped this question) were competed and evaluated at incremental stages.  
 
Table 9.    Competition in the Award of OTA 
Was the OTA Competed Counts Percentage 
NO 2 14% 
Competed & Evaluated at Incremental Stages 7 50% 
Not for Incremental Stages 2 14% YES 
N/A 3 22% 
Total 14 100% 
 
4. Transitioning Opportunity 
Government and Congress realized the importance of not having the sufficient 
transition opportunities for the prototype weapons systems developed under the OTA.  In 
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addressing this issue Congress enacted Section 822 (Public Law 107-107) in December 
2001.  This legislation provided providing new language for awarding follow-on 
production contracts for OTA if the following conditions are met: competitive procedures 
are used in the selection process; a prototyping project is completed; and a predetermined 
number of units along with pre-specified target price in the follow-on production adhered 
to the terms and conditions of the original OTA.   
The researchers identified five options available that could transition an OTA for 
follow-on work (production or services).  These include: (1) FAR Part 15, (2) FAR Part 
12, (3) FAR Subpart 13.5, (4) FAR Subpart 37.2, and (5) DFARS Subpart 212.70.  
To understand the realities that these commercial companies are facing regarding 
the transitioning issue, survey question 8 asked: 
“Upon completion of the prototype under OTA, was there a plan to transition the 
prototype to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) acquisition? (transition is 
defined as having production plans for DoD upon completion of OTA)” 
All respondents answered this question, and the results are displayed in Table 10.  
Surprisingly, only 20 percent of the respondents expressed a desire to transition the 
prototype to FAR acquisition.  This low percentage suggests a potential barrier for 
transition or alternative follow-on plans outside of DoD for successfully developed OTAs. 
 
Table 10.   Plan to Transition to FAR After Completion of OTA 
Plan to Transition to FAR Counts Percentage 
Yes 3 20% 
No 12 80% 
Total 15 100% 
 
To further explore the transitioning opportunities for companies that successfully 
completed OTAs, survey question 9 asked: 
“Under which FAR type acquisition was the prototype intended to transition?” 
The results are displayed in Table 11 with three respondents who answered “Yes” 
in the previous question providing a response.  Of the three respondents, one answered 
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that their company intended to use “negotiated contract” (FAR Part 15), another indicated 
“no comment,” and the third chose “not applicable” in the answer.  Unfortunately, the 
responses do not explain why the two respondents put “no comment” and “not 
applicable.”   
Interestingly, none of the respondents chose commercial acquisition, commercial 
acquisition using SAP, or the pilot program for transition established by Congress as their 
answer.  Questions 12 and 13, Interview Data Section and Other Insights Section, of this 
Chapter provide greater information from DoD and Industry on why these transition 
opportunities are not being utilized.   
 
Table 11.   Transitioning Plan After Completion of OTA 
Transitioning Plan Counts Percentage 
Negotiated Contract (FAR Part 15) 1 33% 
Commercial acquisition (FAR Part 12) 0 0% 
Commercial acquisition utilizing Simplified 
Acquisition Procedures not to exceed $5.5 million 
(FAR Part 13.5) 
0 0% 
Pilot program for transition to follow-on contracting 
after use of OTA (DFARS 212.70) 0 0% 
No comment 1 33% 
N/A 1 33% 
Total 3 100% 
 
AAS aspect under FAR Subpart 37.2 for follow-on opportunities was treated as a 
separate question, since it involved potential services contract as opposed to the 
production focus in Question 9.  Hence, question 10 was designed to understand the 
usage of such clause by non-traditional firms, which asked: 
“Did you provide any consulting services (FAR Part 37.2) to DoD concerning the 
developed prototype?” 
All respondents answered this question, and the results are displayed in Table 12.  
Of the three respondents who had plans to transition to FAR, none provided AAS to DoD.  
This shows that the answers from these respondents were accurate because there would 
be no AAS needed if the OTA could be transitioned into FAR-based acquisition.  The 
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important results that needed attention were those 12 respondents who did not plan to 
transition to FAR-based acquisition.  Four out of the 12 respondents (33 percent) 
answered that they provided AAS to DoD.  This is a very important finding from the 
OTA transitioning perspective, since non-traditional firms that could not or did not desire 
to transition to follow-on production acquisition could still have the opportunity to 
participate and provide professional advice from the successfully developed OTA 
prototypes or future weapons systems that may require their expertise.   
 
Table 12.   Advisory and Assistance Services Provided to DoD 
Not Planning to Transition to FAR AAS Provided to DoD Percentage 
12 4 33% (4/12) 
 
After completing the OTA, the non-traditional firms can take the developed 
prototype projects and produce for commercial opportunities.  To assess this, survey 
question 13 asked: 
“Were there other follow-on plans for your prototyping?” 
The results are displayed in Table 13.  The respondents were allowed to choose 
multiple answers or input other choices that were not listed.  Of the 15 respondents, one 
did not answer this question and another respondent wrote that their OTA was to study 
the feasibility of a project and would require no follow-on plan (provided support 
function to OTA project). 
Eleven of the 13 respondents who answered the question (85 percent) selected 
conducting “Further in-house R&D” following the OTA.  More than three-fourths of the 
respondents said they wanted  “Commercial Development” following the OTA.  
Interestingly, the results from this question correlate highly with results from question 4, 
where the primary incentive for firms to conduct OTAs was to bypass onerous Federal 





Table 13.   Other Follow-on Plans Besides Government Business. Multiple Answers 
Allowed 
Follow-on Plans Counts Percentage 
Further in-house R&D 11 85% 
Commercial Development 10 77% 
License to another firm 0 0% 
 
5. DoD’s Position Toward Transition 
Understanding  DoD’s position toward transitioning was deemed an important 
aspect for successful transition.  Survey questions 11 and 12 were designed to understand 
DoD’s attitude toward transitioning as perceived by the respondents. 
Survey question 11 asked: 
“Did the DoD agency or service encourage you to transition the OTA for 
further production or development?” 
All respondents answered this question with results displayed in Table 14.  Only 
five of the respondents (33 percent) felt that DoD encouraged them to transition the OTA 
for further production or development. 
 
Table 14.   If DoD encouraged to Transition for Further Production/Development 
Transitioning Plan Counts Percentage 
Yes 5 33% 
No 10 67% 
Total 15 100% 
  
Question 12 further asked: 
“Did you experience any barriers for follow-on development/production with 
DoD?” 
Again, all respondents answered this question with results displayed in Table 15.  
Six of the respondents (40 percent) experienced barriers for follow-on 




Table 15.   Experience of Barriers for Follow-on Development/Production with DoD 
Barriers for Follow-on 
Development/Production with DoD Counts Percentage 
Yes 6 40% 
No 9 60% 
Total 15 100% 
 
Four out of the six respondents who selected a “Yes” answer also provided   
explanations for barriers experienced with the OTA as shown in Table 16. 
 
Table 16.   Barriers Cited by Respondents 
Respondent Barriers Cited 
1 
Just the standard barriers on all Government contracts. 
Too much paper and inflexible and uncooperative 
Defense Contract Audit Agency. 
2 USAF pulled out of agreement in violation of terms of joint Memorandum of Agreement with DARPA. 
3 
We were just a very small sub to a larger prime on this 
effort. Our support work was entirely analytical for the 
Phase 1 FALCON-Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle project. 
4 
I bid on related contract but was not given proper 
consideration. From what I understand, the person in 
charge of the DoD acquisition was later found guilty & 
went to jail favoring the "traditional" DoD contractor 
but award was given to another "traditional" DoD 
contractor and my company was never even notified of 
the outcome even though I reported the individual to 
Pentagon officials. The incident pretty much wrecked 
my business and I elected never to deal with DoD again. 
  
6. Experience by OTA Participants 
OTA has been a great tool for DoD to access the commercial technology that has 
outpaced the military-specific technology.  Many successful prototypes have been 
developed under OTA, which now plays an important role in military technology 
development.  It is therefore of great importance to assess the experiences of OTA 
participants who have conducted business with DoD. Survey question 14 is designed to 
understand all aspects of business relationships experienced by the respondents.  
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Specifically, the question let the respondents express their experience from five different 
aspects.  These aspects include: (1) organizational interface; (2) business process 
employed by DoD; (3) protocols well defined; (4) DoD employees knowledge and ability; 
and (5) overall experience.  Survey question 14 asked: 
“Please rate your experience with DoD in the OTA business” 
All respondents answered this question, and the results are displayed in Table 17.  
Responses to questions were anchored using a five-level satisfaction scale (i.e., terrible, 
unsatisfied, neutral, satisfied, and excellent).   
Table 17.   Experience with DoD in the OTA business 
Experience with DoD in the OTA
business: 
Terrible Unsatisfied Neutral Satisfied Excellent
0 2 1 9 3Organizational interface 0% 13% 7% 60% 20%
2 1 3 7 2Business process employed by the
DoD 13% 7% 20% 47% 13%
0 4 4 4 3Protocols well defined 0% 27% 27% 27% 20%
2 2 3 6 2DoD employees knowledge &
ability 13% 13% 20% 40% 13%
2 1 4 6 2Overall experience 13% 7% 27% 40% 13%
 
Further, to examine trends in satisfaction, the answers from the respondents are 
put into chart form, which is shown in Figure 14.  An easy way to measure the 
satisfaction is to calculate the satisfaction differential by subtracting the bottom two box 
scores—the combined percentage of those saying their experiences were unsatisfied and 
terrible—from the top two box scores (excellent and satisfied).  The analysis of 
satisfaction differential from each category shows Organizational Interface (67 points) 
and Business Process Employed by DoD (40 points) with the highest satisfaction of the 
five categories.  Protocols Well Defined (20 points) and DoD Employee Knowledge and 
Ability (27 points) were computed as the lowest two categories.  The final category, 
Overall Experience, was calculated near the middle range with 33 points.  This analysis 
infers that there is a general perception of greater problems associated with the Protocols 

































Figure 14.   Trends in OTA Satisfaction Score 
 
Question 15 asked the respondents to provide comments that they felt were not 
covered in the survey.  This question was open-ended and allowed the respondents to 
offer as many or as few comments as they wanted.    Survey question 15 asked: 
“Do you have any other comments or observations not covered here that you would 
like to contribute?” 
 Overall, more negative comments were expressed by the respondents than 
positive comments.  Comments that the researchers felt important are highlighted in bold.  
Besides, the comments along with previous literature review and study were taken into 






Table 18.   Open-ended Remarks Provided by Respondents 
Comments Do you have any other comments or observations not covered here that you would like to contribute? 
Negative 
1 
Many Government contracting officers are reluctant to "push the 
envelope" on OTAs due to fears about being criticized after the fact by 
auditors and Inspector Generals (IG). Although some agreement officers 
are proficient in the use of OTAs, this expertise is limited and is not 
reflected in the general contracting field. In the world of R&D the primary 
benefit is the relaxed Intellectual Property (IP) provisions that enable 
contractors to take advantage of firms working primarily in the commercial 
world where they are very protective of their IP. 
2 
Criticism (frequently unfair) by the DoD IG and certain members of 
Congress of DoD's use of OT agreements has made many DoD contracting 
officials very gun shy regarding the use of OTs. DoD contracting officials 
are often afraid to agree to use an OT agreement instead of a traditional FAR
R&D contract because of fears that they will be later criticized by the DoD 
IG or Congress. As a result, OTs are not utilized with commercial 
companies as often as possible. As a result, it is common for commercial 
companies to decline to perform R&D for DoD when the only tool in 
DoD's tool chest of funding agreements is a traditional FAR R&D 
contract. This situation prevents DoD from obtaining access to the latest 
leading-edge, commercial technologies that would be of great benefit to the 
warfighter and the national defense. 
3 
As a small business concern, we would like to see more OTA contracts. We 
find it very inefficient and painful to participate in programs subject to 
the FAR. OTA more closely resembles the commercial contracts that we 
regularly participate in. 
4 
Two organizations were involved: AFRL & Acquisition. The experience 
with AFRL was great. In contrast, the business dealing with acquisition was 
worst experience of my life. I would not wish the same on anyone! 
5 
Overall a negative experience for our firm and the taxpayers due to USAF 
incompetence and duplicitousness. In general, Agreement Officers are 
incapable of effectively using OTAs as Congress intended. 
6 
This was a pre-dredge program for several beach restoration projects in 
South Carolina.  All work as done using existing capabilities and 
technologies.  We typically perform projects for the Corps of Engineers as a 
sub-contractor for larger firms with Architectural-Engineering Task Order 
contracts.  The projects in question were solicited primarily due to lack of an 
existing Task Order and were sent out for competitive bid. 
Positive 
1 
OTA worked for us and DARPA because they had smart people in a 
position to make decision quickly on behalf of the Government and 
therefore could help us as appropriate. 
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2 We would be happy to provide services to the DoD if there are projects that match our expertise. 
3 
On the OTA conducted with a major defense contractor (i.e. NGC), we were 
provided a small amount, $60K to do support work on the prototype.  There 
was no interface with the DoD entity (i.e. DARPA).  But, this did provide us 
funding to do research and to help grow our business, both in terms of 
technical capabilities and also making useful contacts within NGC.  In 
contrast, we also participated in the DARPA RASCAL project on a team 
that involved Coleman, PanAero, and other companies, and that one did 
provide us with the opportunity to meet DARPA and DoD officials directly. 
As a small start-up company, this was great for us as it provided “face time” 
with the Government. It would have been nice to have had the same 
opportunity on the FALCON project. This project was competed with other 
firms, and our joint team was down-selected out of Phase 2.  But, I believe 
DoD’s competitive, sequential down-select process is good for us and 
business in general. 
       We have done some other work for DoD, primarily with the Air Force 
and found conducting business with cost-type contracts can be burdensome. 
Having to provide cost information and provide justification to DCAA can 
add significant administrative work load to a small business to the point 
where the cost of doing business with DoD exceeds the benefits.  As a 
growing business, direct and indirect rates change rapidly, and having to 
track these changes and justify bid rates and incurred costs to the 
Government (DCAA) takes away from the primary goal of our company. 
Administratively, it is much easier for us to bid and support firm fixed price 
contracts compared to cost-type contracts. 
       We prefer doing business with DoD on fixed-type contracts and OTAs. 
As a work around, we often use pass-through mechanisms with larger 
companies serving as the Government prime for us, and relegating us to a 
subcontractor role. This is done to avoid the FAR and CAS regulations, but 
this method reduces the “face time” with Government we desire and reduces 
our overall visibility within the DoD. Ideally, we prefer FFP mechanism 
options as direct Government contractors. SBIRs are this way, but few 
options exist for purely analysis-type or study-type work in this category. 
Neutral 
1 
Our assistance consists of prototyping that allows the respective agency to 
evaluate emerging technologies from DoD suppliers. They are using 
equipment in their prototypes that we have already internally developed and 
privately funded. 
2 
Regarding transition of the OTA to another mechanism, our firm wasn't 
privy to those discussions. They would have taken place with the prime 
contractor. Our small award was just a fixed-price effort under them. 
3 Use of the OTA was helpful. Development stoppage was not due to OTA difficulties but instead due to change of DoD direction which is reasonable. 
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D. INTERVIEW DATA ANALYSIS  
 Below interviews are comprised of feedback relevant to this research directly 
from DoD officials and consultants.  These individuals all possessed significant work 
experience and knowledge in OTAs.  The interview questions focused on five main areas 
which are transitioning issues, current transition opportunities, DoD’s position toward 
transition, trend in OTA usage, and comments for recommendations provided by 
interviewees. 
1. Transitioning Issues 
“Presently, Other Transaction Authority for the Development of Prototypes (OTA) 
does not extend into the production phase of the Acquisition Lifecycle.  Has this 
hindered non-traditional and commercial firms from participating in the OTA 
process? Why or why not?” 
 
 [SC] No, companies will tend to produce to prove a concept performing under an 
OTA, especially if there is enough incentive regardless of the ability for follow-on 
production with DoD.  The initial incentives are economic, DoD dollars available for the 
OTA.  Part of the problem is the company does not have to participate with DoD.  But, 
by participating in an OTA, they are able to leverage Government resources (e.g. funds, 
expertise, etc.). 
  
 [DO] No, the very successful OTAs have been bought out by traditional defense 
companies. For example, the Frontier Systems was bought out by Boeing after the 
technology was successfully proved under the OTA. Same goes with Global Hawk when 
Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical was bought by Northrop-Grumman.  So, the production 
aspects were transitioned to Boeing and Northrop-Grumman who have the capability and 
means to produce under FAR guidelines.  There was no need for non-traditional 
companies in these two cases to transition into production when a large, traditional 
defense contractor can buy them out.  However, a company may not want to transition to 
production.  Take commercial firms whose incentive is the dual technology where there 
is a commercial payoff and would like to leverage funding and resources from DoD 
through the OTA.  The DoD market may represent only 5 percent of the total market for 
these firms; therefore, there is little drive to try to transition an OTA for production using 
FAR Part 12 or 13.5.  Often these commercial firms will have a commercial product that 
will be sold as a commercial item. 
  
 [JA] No. They are excited about getting the Government’s investment to pursue 
projects that they do not have the resources to pursue on their own.  They could also be 
thinking of a huge commercial market in the future; but, they recognize that with the 
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Government’s investment and their own, they can push the technology along the trail to 
maturity.  In my experiences, the reason large commercial companies are in fact with the 
Government at all (whether it is a FAR-based contract or an OTA) is because of the 
Government resources that are being provided….  Anytime they can get somebody else 
to share in some of their development costs, it is in their interest.  The reason why they 
would want to pursue the OT for prototype is because now all of the requirements in the 
FAR where the procurement laws do not apply, and that gives them greater flexibility 
dealing with their own firms. 
 
 [LC] With the change some years back allowing low rate production of finished 
prototypes under the OT, it has not been a problem for CBRTA to date.  I assess it would 
be a problem for a product like the Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive 
Device Electronic Warfare (Improvised Explosive Device Jammer) which was developed 
by one of our alliance partners but not under the CBRTA OT agreement. 
 
”In your view, do you believe a successfully developed prototype under OTA fulfills 
acquisition milestones B & C? If yes, why doesn’t DoD apply OTA for all weapon 
development programs (this would help improve cost performance schedule for 
issues that currently plague our programs)?” 
 
 [SC] There is potential for fulfilling Milestone B/C if the project is properly 
document with appropriate data. Global Hawk prototype completed under an OTA was 
transitioned to the Air Force. It then underwent two years of ‘Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development’ before it was given production approval. 
 
 [DO] In some sense, they do.  It can if you have commercial companies driving 
the entire process without Government giving direction. They can make the best value 
trade-offs in a particular program. 
 Some barriers to this process are: lack of understanding, no requirement for 
training, leaving it up to services to decide what is appropriate.  The services are very 
large vice DARPA, which is comprised of 200 personnel. Therefore, it takes much 
greater scrutiny, time, and bureaucracy to review and approve OTA in the services.  At 
the same time, the services also change the inherent process to make it more in their 
image using a number of FAR and DFARS clauses; therefore, the OTA features are lost in 
the process.  
 
 [JA] Generally, I do not believe that OTAs should be used to fulfill weapon 
acquisition milestones B or C.  When a program gets that big, you will be dealing with 
traditional, defense contractors.  In regards to non-traditionals to a significant extent is 
less and less.  I really believe OTAs are before that, to try things out, to build a few, to 
test to determine if it works.  Once a decision is made that it works, then you think about 
applying it to a major milestone under DoD 5000.1 and 5000.2.  There are too many 
issues with big ‘A’ acquisitions under DoD 5000.1, 5000.2, and the associated 
regulations that make it a slow, prodding process.  OTAs are great to prove concepts, but 
should not be a replacement for Milestone B or C if there are great quantities involved.   
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2. Current Transition Opportunities 
“In your experience, what transition options under FAR regulations have been used 
to assist non-traditional firms enter into the production phase after completion of 
the OTA? To what extent have these been utilized? What about FAR Parts 12, 13.5, 
37?” 
 
 [SC] An example is the Global Hawk prototype where Teledyne Ryan 
Aeronautical was purchased.  If you are a small company with a successful product like 
the Global Hawk prototype completed by Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical, a large defense 
contractor will acquire your business.  
 
 [DO] Successfully developed OTAs have been bought out by large, traditional 
defense contractors. As for FAR Part 12, I have twice tried using [it] to acquire 
commercial services for R&D, but it is awkward and often very difficult to establish 
commercial labor rates from companies that typically perform research for other 
companies. It is much easier using an OTA.  As for FAR Part 37, companies can also 
offer their services via GSA service contracts to provide technical services to the 
Government in follow-on efforts after the OTA is completed. 
 
 [JA] The transition depends on the nature of the program.  The most logical 
method for commercial firms to transition a prototype project into a FAR-based contract 
is FAR Part 12.  If that project had major elements that were of large, traditional 
contractors, then the transition path is FAR Part 15.  For many of the larger projects that 
DoD has done, that is the applicable means of transition.  They were led by large, 
traditional defense contractors with non-traditional defense contractors playing a 
significant role somehow; and then when it came time to go into traditional acquisition, 
the large, defense contractor was not afraid and took his FAR-based contract and was 
happy….  FAR Part 13 is about small purchases with a test plan of $5.5 million.  I do not 
see anyone smart enough to use that.  If they have, I am not aware of it.  FAR Part 37, I 
do not ever remember seeing anything like that as services….   
 The biggest problem when transitioning from an OTA into FAR-based 
requirement is competition requirements.  That is what the DFARS Subpart 212.70 is 
trying to solve.  It is saying if competition was done, knowing the quantities and prices 
established up front, then there is no need to re-compete for transition.  Note, full and 
open competition may exist at the beginning of the OTA process (anybody can compete), 
but ‘full and open’ does not apply because they are outside the procurement statutes.  For 
example, a way to conduct a DFARS Subpart 212.70 is to establish the target quantity to 
be purchased when the prototype enters into production.  The target price will also be 
established in the original OTA.  The companies will then go through the development 
process and complete all tests to show it does work.  The Government then has the option 
to buy that amount of items at a fixed price, without further competition in accordance 
with this regulation.  However, the real problem is the Government does not want to enter 
into one of these if there is little development going on; but, for a commercial company, 
it would be hard to commit to a price on an item that has not been developed yet.  But, 
the idea is to get around the competition issue.  For the Government who has invested a 
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great deal of money into an OTA (whether commercial or traditional), it provides an 
option to having to initiate a ‘justification and approval’ or ‘full and open’ competition 
process. 
 
 [LC] I am not personally aware of any FAR actions in this area.  Most of our 
commercial companies flee the FAR because of all the baggage it carries and most 
Government contracts for CBR related items are small compared to commercial sales. 
 
“Are there non-FAR options available (e.g. COSSI11)? What are these? Have these 
been utilized?” 
 
 [SC] COSSI was a good program when it was live. 
  
 [DO] Successfully developed prototypes are usually bought out by another 
company.  COSSI was popular during the Clinton administration as a way to help save 
money on operating costs. 
 
 [JA] If you are going to buy in quantity, you must use the FAR…In the COSSI 
program, the whole idea was to attract commercial off-the-shelf items.  There were many 
of those projects that did use FAR Part 12 as their transition tool.  A number of those used 
Part 15 because it was replacing commercial variant software for the F-15 fighter. 
 
3. DoD’s Position Toward Transition 
“How would you comment on Department of Defense’s (DoD) success to enable non-
traditional firms in transitioning a completed OTA for follow-on production 
opportunities? What do you think are the limiting factors?” 
 
 [SC] Mergers allow non-traditional firms to transition a prototype since large 
defense firms have the ability to produce under FAR. 
 
 [JA] That is the biggest problem with OTA.  If DoD wants it very bad, they will 
pay someone to deliver it.  It might cost $200 million more and add an additional three 
years for somebody else to get up to speed as the non-traditional.  That is the first 
thought.  The second thought: All of the problems of making the switch (i.e., the 
competition requirement of the FAR).  The reason it is such a big deal is timing and time 
because if a decision is made to re-compete after the prototype is done; then it will 
require a statement of work, source selection plans, initial solicitation, source selection 
evaluation, and make an award.  So, six to nine months go by.  Will the traditional player 
keep their team together that made these prototypes?  What happens to that capability or 
interest if it takes nine months to make a decision?  That is the real problem.   
                                                 
11 Projects improving the performance of existing military systems, while incurring cost savings by 
infusing commercial technologies is referred to as the Commercial Operations and Support Savings 
Initiative (COSSI) 
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 [DO] When a traditional defense contractor adopts commercial like qualities, it 
results in becoming faster and cheaper for the Government.  It requires a behavior-like 
change for defense industry.  But, there is a cost associated with implementing change. 
Are these (traditional defense) companies willing to change age-old practices?  Take 
Raytheon for example.  To accommodate the OTA process early on, Raytheon created its 
own commercial subsidiary, and stated that they saved some 50 basis points in overhead 
costs in doing so.  We wanted them to change their behavior and become more 
commercial, but most companies would prefer to remain FAR compliant. 
 
 [LC] I am sure there have been success but I opine they are few and far between.  
The Government does not recognize the failure of the FAR to reach out to commercial 
companies and even when they do their answer is always modify the FAR (e.g., FASA, 
FARA) to accommodate this particular circumstance.  It is time the Government 
recognizes that to reach out to the best minds and the latest technology requires a new 
way of doing business. 
4. Trend in OTA Usage 
“What is your assessment of the OTA usage in the near future for DoD and other 
agencies and the effects toward non-traditional firms?” 
 
 [SC] Current legislation drives the need for large defense firms to use non-
traditional firms or cost sharing.  So, most firms would rather partner with non-
traditionals as a result (Note, non-traditionals must contribute significantly to the OTA).  
This requirement adds additional time and cost to the OTA process.  It is important to 
note the use of non-traditional firms in OTAs is highly favored by Congress. 
 
 [DO] Not in big favor currently, though the authority was recently extended for 
another 3 years.  The political buy-in is not there.  A change in administration may deem 
it appropriate or not, depending on which candidate wins the election. 
 We would like more participation from commercial and non-traditionals at 
primarily the prime contractor level although we tend to see their participation at the 
subcontractor level.  Traditional contractors still like OTAs and compete for these 
arrangements and often using the strategic alliance of non-traditional firms at the sub 
level. 
 
 [JA] More agencies should be using it; not only DoD, but also civilian agencies.  
The reason why OTAs are not being utilized is because there is a lack of education, lack 
of interest, and it does require the technical guys to think different and look for 
commercial solutions.  Most of them are not trained to do that either.   
 [LC] With the draft guidelines that are provided by DoD right now, fewer 
companies will work with the DoD. I opine the utility of the OT will diminish to a point 
where its use will decrease and probably eventually not be used.  Few contracting officers 
and legal personnel in DoD really understand OTA and therefore view it as a threat.  
They have grown up with the FAR and the normal list of DoD contractors and are happy 
where they are. 
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5. Recommendations and Comments 
“Do you have any recommendations to improve the transitioning process for non-
traditional firms?” 
 
 [SC] Non-traditionals have to conform to FAR-based clauses.  An example is 
Boeing. They were primarily a commercial plane company that created a military 
division to be able to conduct business with DoD.  Note, Boeing utilized a lot of 
resources to gain compliance. 
 
“Do you have any other comments or observations that you would like to 
contribute?” 
 
 [SC] OTAs are a great tool.  We don’t want to lose this ability that provides the 
best arrangements for Government and industry since they provide benefits to both sides.  
For industry, it allows them a ‘foot in the door’ to establish an inside track for future DoD 
projects.  There is a perception that [there is] no incentive to maintain the OTA program 
since the authority has no permanence.  The Section 845 has to be renewed by Congress 
every certain period.  Also, there are few individuals who are qualified in contracting to 
perform and execute OTAs. 
 
 [DO] OTAs have not taken off for a number of reasons.  First, OTAs have been 
heavily criticized by the Inspector General (IG) because it wanted unrealistic auditing and 
oversight for non-traditional firms.  These stringent requirements were simply not 
acceptable to these firms.  A great deal of time has been spent on responding to IG 
inquiries.  We are in the operations side of contracting. To respond to IG concerns means 
taking considerable time away from doing the job…A FAR-based contract is much easier 
to defend, because it is done by the book.  There is also the perception that there are not 
many safeguards associated with OTAs, yet sound business judgment from competent 
contracting officers has to be employed. The Future Combat Systems scandal also 
damaged the OTA reputation.  As a result, legislation added new requirements and layers 
to OTA approval making the process more difficult…The more scrutiny on the OTA 
program, the less likely companies will want to participate. 
 
 [JA] The big concern is the usage of OTs even at DARPA is down.  There are 
less and less people using them.  There are less and less program managers who 
understand how to use them.  When you look at statistics, there is a great deal of usage 
early on with lots of money.  Now, there are very few done and by few people.  This 
certainly is an observation.   
 
 [LC] The initial OTA was developed by DARPA to get to the right people fast 
who did not meet any of the FAR requirements.  These are wonderful requirements (FAR) 
for the bureaucrat who wants to feel secure but it does little to take the risk necessary for 
major R&D advances. For OTA to truly develop into an outreach tool for Government: 
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• Tear up the emerging DoD OTA guidelines. They will kill any OTA 
program. What contractor will bring any of his R&D to Government if 
their investment to date cannot be counted for cost-share? 
• Expand the OTA to include production up to 100,000 units of OTA 
developed prototypes. 
• Encourage Government teaming in the use of the OTA with agencies not 
currently using the OTA, being able to team with an OTA agency without 
any level of funding restrictions. 
• Allow creativity by OTA agencies to get the most money to the end R&D 
developer.  For example, CBRTA does not contract directly with 
Universities.  Their load fees are abusive. 
• Allow the OTA to accept grant money.  Currently OTA is not allowed to 
accept grant money and that is where significant R&D is being done. 
 
E. OTHER INSIGHTS PROVIDED 
The following information was based on notes transcribed from phone 
conversations with two individuals in industry who are experienced in OTAs.  A follow-
on email requesting consent to use their comments for this paper was forwarded.  These 
individuals provided consent, but with the following conditions: The first industry official 
[IO] declined to have his name or company identified in this paper.  The second 
individual, Richard Kuyath [RK] is a general counsel in private industry who requested 
to include a disclaimer that the opinions expressed in this paper are his personally and not 
attributable to the company that employs him.  Their comments are available in Appendix 
F.  Comments most relevant to this research are provided below: 
 
 [IO] We are still conducting the same amount of OTAs, but now with non-DoD 
sources such as the Department of Homeland Security.  Other departments are also 
gaining use of OTAs. 
 [RK] Commercial firms have to deal with intense pressures globally and from 
Wall Street to perform. As a result the addition of high cost, Government-unique systems 
to enable the commercial firms to comply with Government-unique contract requirements 
is often not a priority when the commercial firm's total Government business may be as 
little as one percent of the firm's total annual sales 
 [RK] OTAs provide flexibility for commercial firms to bypass Government-
unique contract requirements under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense 
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Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and Cost Accounting Standards 
(CAS).  Commercial firms have little business incentive to implement expensive systems 
that will enable them to comply with these Government-unique contract requirements, 
which will add significant cost to be borne in part by their commercial business. These 
added costs will make them less competitive in the commercial marketplace where as 
much as 99 percent of their revenues are derived. 
 F. SUMMARY 
This chapter examines many aspects of the OTA operating environment with the 
focus on the transitioning opportunities for non-traditional firms.  A survey and 
interviews were used to explore the reasons why private industry enter into an OTA, the 
competitive requirement, the current transitioning opportunities, DoD’s position toward 
transition, and the experience by OTA participants.  The interview process and comments 
provided from phone conversations were used to collect in-depth information on the 
transitioning perspective.  Specifically, the data from interviews included transitioning 
issues, current transition opportunities, DoD’s position toward transition, trends in OTA 
usage, and recommendations and comments from various Government and industry 
officials.   
The analysis from both the surveys and interviews indicate difficulties by firms in 
achieving transitioning opportunities for production with DoD from a completed 
prototype.   From the industry perspective, the firms surveyed disclosed no intent to 
transition and identified barriers that excluded these opportunities.  This view was 
supported by interviews and personal insights that private industry (non-traditional firms) 
is interested more in commercial development and production that can result in greater 
profitability potential.  Nevertheless, survey respondents confirmed some follow-on 
activity with DoD through the use of AAS.   
As a result, the final chapter examines the problems associated with the 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research was to explore the opportunities available for non-
traditional companies to transition their completed prototype projects for follow-on 
production based on legislation created by Congress and statutes outlined under FAR and 
DFARS.  This chapter presents conclusions, recommendations, and answers to the 
research questions initially asked in Chapter I.  In closing, the researchers suggest areas 
for further study.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
A number of significant findings can be drawn from the responses to surveys and 
interviews summarized in Chapter IV.  The principal findings are described below.    
1. Transition Alternative 
Mergers provide an alternative to transitioning for extremely successful 
developed prototypes from an OTA.  Two examples were provided from the interviews 
with DoD and OSD officials: The A-160 Hummingbird and Global Hawk Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle.  Both OTAs were competed and awarded to non-traditional firms via a 
multi-phase, down-select approach that included competition from large defense 
contractors.  However, the success of these non-traditionals resulted in them being 
acquired by large traditional firms.  Frontier Systems, the developer of the Hummingbird 
prototype, was bought by the Boeing Company.  The developers of Global Hawk, 
Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical, were purchased by Northrop Grumman Corporation.  Both 
prototypes were able to be transitioned into production under FAR Part 15 contract after 
being bought by large, traditional defense contractors who had the ability to comply and 
produce under FAR and CAS. 
 
 78
2. Negative OTA Experiences Shared by Respondents of Non-traditional 
Firms 
A significant portion of respondents viewed the performance of DoD officials (26 
percent) and protocols (27 percent) of the OTA process as negative (Terrible or 
Unsatisfied rating) from the survey results.  In addition, open-ended comments from the 
survey provided some insights to their experiences: (1) the acquisition process of OTA as 
“worst experience of my life,” (2) the overall negative experience attributed to the 
agreement officers’ incompetence, and (3) the observations that agreement officers’ 
performance is constrained due to scrutiny from members of Congress and DoD IG.  
DoD officials and Mr. Kuyath also shared the same concerns regarding Congress’ and 
IGs’ criticism that has paralyzed those who manage and execute OTA agreements. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Revise Current OTA Transition Legislation Under DFARS 212.70 
The requirements that authorize the ability for non-traditional contractors to 
transition a completed prototype under DFARS 212.70 must be revised to eliminate the 
conditions that unrealistically call for the predetermination of price and quantities in the 
original OTA agreement before the prototype is actually completed.  These criteria would 
be difficult for agreement officers and the non-traditional firm to determine since 
standard contract requirements such as cost or pricing data are not mandated due to the 
nature of OTAs.  It adds a great amount of risk to the program if prices and quantities 
cannot be accurately predicted since the development of the prototype has not been 
completed.  In the interview with Mr. Ablard, he states:   
To conduct a DFARS Subpart 212.70 is to establish the target quantity to 
be purchased when the prototype enters into production.  The target price 
will also be established in the original OTA…The Government then has 
the option to buy that amount of items at a fixed price, without further 
competition in accordance with this regulation.  However, the real 
problem is the Government does not want to enter into one of these if 
there is little development going on; but, for a commercial company, it 
would be hard to commit to a price on an item that has not been developed 
yet.  But, the idea is to get around the competition issue. 
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Even if the terms and conditions can be agreed upon for the prototype 
development, the matter of funding the follow-on production needs to be planned and 
integrated.  There are too many unknowns and risks associated with this transition option. 
2. Make OTA a Permanent Authority 
The researchers recommend that the OTA authority granted by Section 845 be 
made permanent.  One reason is the need to resolve the lack of agreement officers who 
are qualified and trained, confirmed by the relatively low satisfaction levels from 
respondents regarding DoD officials’ knowledge and experience.  The constant renewal 
of OTA authority (done every three-five years) suggests a low commitment to learning or 
applying OTAs.  Yoder (2006) identifies the same problems associated with FAR Part 
13.5, where the temporary authority has created problems with contracting activities 
hesitant to support the regulation and reluctant to provide resources to “train and structure 
the [acquisition] workforce and associated protocols” (p. 98).  Without any long-term 
relevance associated with OTAs, there will be no commitment to provide for training, 
given the limited resources in DoD. 
3. Optimize Opportunities under CBRTA OTA to Other Agencies 
This study revealed a lack of experienced and knowledgeable agreement officers 
by both industry and DoD officials; therefore, one possible short-term solution would be 
allowing authorized agencies to extend their OTA authority to support other Government 
organizations. 
One example where this has been utilized was under the CBRTA Model that has 
provided opportunities for others without the authority or ability to attain innovative 
technologies.  This is an effective means of sharing OTA, given the lack of qualified 
contracting personnel throughout the Government.  For the same reason, the authority 
should not be arbitrarily granted across all Government agencies, given the potential 
abuse by those who are not qualified.   
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D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following provides answers to the questions initially proposed by researchers 
for the purpose of this study, related to analyzing the transition opportunities afforded to 
non-traditional firm who have conducted OTA prototyping.   
1.  To What Extent have Transition Opportunities been Made Available 
to and Utilized by Non-traditional Firms to Extend Their Completed 
Prototype under the OTA to DoD Production? 
The opportunities appear to be limited for providing transition to non-traditional 
firms via various FAR and DFARS statutes for completed prototypes.  Although 
transitioning under FAR Part 12 and Subpart 13.5 seems to be a logical option available 
to bypass certain procurement regulations calling for oversight and cost data, none of the 
officials interviewed recalled using these statutes for transitioning (the exception cited 
was the COSSI program, which is no longer an active DoD program).  The example with 
EELV to use an OTA to develop a prototype with further production from FAR Part 12 
contract using commercial acquisition illustrates a transition barrier that the anticipated 
commercial market does not realize (See Chapter III).  The DFARS 212.70 authority 
created by Congress specifically outlined transition opportunities to non-traditional firms, 
but was not used due to reasons highlighted in Chapter III.  However, one-third of survey 
respondents did perform AAS for follow-on work with the OTA prototype, despite not 
having any initial plans to transition.  Two DoD officials recommended that companies 
submit AAS via the GSA to advertise technical services to the Government in follow-on 
efforts after the completed OTA. 
2.  What Aspects of the OTA Attract the Non-Traditional Firms to Do 
Business with the Government?  
Industry perspective suggests that the primary considerations for entering into an 
OTA with DoD are to gain funding for R&D projects, including potential dual-use 
technology or products, without being subject to inflexible treatment of IP rights and 
regulations associated with standard procurement.  For the majority of these firms, the 
follow-on intent was to conduct further in-house R&D and produce for the commercial 
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market, with the majority having no plans to transition, even though the production 
aspect would provide the firm greater business from DoD.  The interviews confirmed this 
view from industry, stating that the profit motive is far greater in the commercial market. 
Two interviewees stated that profit from DoD may represent less than 5 percent of total 
revenues.  At the same time, transitioning may incur compliance cost with a FAR Part 15 
contract.  According to Mr. Kuyath, “These added costs will make them less competitive 
in the commercial marketplace, where as much as 99 percent of their revenues are 
derived.”12  The decreased profit potential and added cost burden (e.g., from CAS) are 
valid reasons that deter non-traditional firms from pursuing follow-on production 
opportunities. 
3.  What are the Transitioning Opportunities Experienced by the Non-
Traditional Firms that have Conducted OTA Agreements? 
About one-third of respondents indicated that DoD encouraged the transition of 
the OTA for further production or development.  It is unknown whether DoD was able to 
assess projects for potential transitioning before the prototype was completed, and 
whether this affected results to question 11 of the survey.   But, one industry 
representative shared his thoughts:  
The reason why small (non-traditional) innovative companies do not want 
to transition to production is that the process may require a large defense 
contractor’s production capability.  But, in doing so, the small firm risks 
compromising proprietary data to another traditional firm.  This is a 
genuine fear of many small innovative companies. (Anonymous, personal 
communication, May 13, 2008) 
4.  What are the Transitioning Opportunities Available and Used by DoD 
Officials? 
When DoD officials were asked to provide their assessment of transitioning 
opportunities, different answers were provided.  The DoD and OSD officials stated that  
 
                                                 
12 Disclaimer: Mr. Kuyath’s opinions expressed in this paper are his personally and not attributable to 
the company of his employment. 
 82
mergers allowed large traditional firms to transition prototypes developed by non-
traditionals under FAR Part 15.  Two examples are Global Hawk UCAV and the 
Hummingbird A-160 projects.   
5.  What are the Barriers, if any, Encountered by the Non-Traditional 
Firms that Limit Transitioning Opportunities? 
The survey results show that 40 percent experienced barriers for follow-on 
development work or production with their OTA prototype.  Four comments were 
provided, identifying the following causes: the standard barriers (e.g., too much 
paperwork) associated with all Government contracts; the uncooperative nature of 
Defense Contract Audit Agency; the unilateral termination of an OTA agreement; and 
improper practices by contracting officials.  The researchers interpreted these comments 
to be related to barriers in the OTA process and not relevant to transitioning.   
E. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Several topics should be further examined.  First, the basic should be evaluated 
for allowing a firm’s IR&D to be allocated toward cost-sharing.  This issue was 
introduced by the IG in a 1999 Audit Report, stating that IR&D funds should not be 
included as part of the cost-share requirement (See Chapter II).  However, the 
Department of Homeland Security Guidebook on OTAs permits IR&D to be included as 
part of the cost-share: “IR&D costs incurred in preparing, submitting, and supporting 
offers on potential OTAs also are allowable to the extent they are allocable and 
reasonable” (2005, p. 1-5).  Additionally, from a conversation with an industry official 
who had conducted an OTA with DoD comes this experience: 
Prior to the OTA, our company invested millions of dollars in time and 
costs to produce the technology to date.  When the government entered the 
OTA with us, they were able to get the technology on the cheap.  However, 
we were able to get additional funding from the OTA to enhance our 
technology for the government and against our competitors. (Anonymous, 
personal communication, April 10, 2008) 
 In the course of this study, different standards were applied to determine what 
actually defines a non-traditional firm as opposed to the standard provided by Congress 
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per Public Law 106-398.  Existing statutes would automatically designate a firm to be 
traditional if it entered into an OTA or contract subject to CAS where the amount of the 
award exceeds $500,000.  This could preclude many non-traditional firms from doing 
business with DoD to one agreement or contract per year, thereby limiting competition 
and the availability of DoD to access commercial technology.   
 In conclusion, the researchers suggest the above topics to be examined further.  
The researchers hope the study has provided the readers with extensive knowledge on the 
background of OTA, the transitioning opportunities along with recommendations to 
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APPENDIX A.  PERCENTAGE OF DOD REPORTED 
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APPENDIX B.  GRAPHS SHOWING PROJECTED AGING 
POPULATION AND SHRINKING WORKFORCE  
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APPENDIX E.  BIOGRAPHY OF MR. CLARK 
Lawrence M. Clarke Jr. 
Clarke Consulting, Principal 






TS/SCI; SBI date 8/31/2006 :  last CI ploy 7/2001 
 
Education 
• Naval Postgraduate School Annual Classified Advanced Technology Update Short 
Course (EC-4900) April 2005, July 2004, July 2003, July 2002; July 2001; March 2000 
• Louisiana State University’s Center for Advanced Microstructures and Devices 
(CAMD), Nanotechnology in Biology, Biotechnology and Medicine Workshop 2003 
• Graduate School U.S. Department of Agriculture Management Accountability and 
Control December 1995 
• Defense Intelligence College – 1973-74 
• Industrial College of the Armed Forces – 1969 
• B.S. Business, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University – 1965 
 
Publications:   
Science and Technology Initiatives:  Consumer Digital C4I Applications 3 Jan 1993 for the 
Center for Naval Analysis 
 
Experience Summary 
Present:  Clarke Consulting, Principal. 
• Consulting agreements as follows: 
o Currently serve part-time as the Program Support Manager for the National Technology 
Alliance (NTA’s), Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Technology Alliance (CBRTA).   The 
National Technology Alliance is a federal government program with the Director of National 
Intelligence’s (DNI) Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) serving as 
executive agent.  CBRTA is an Alliance of 13 major U.S. owned corporations and 30+ 
subcontractors representing over ~$240B is sales in 2006 and conducting over $13B in internal 
research and development that same year.  The Alliance includes 3M, General Dynamics (the 
Alliance government integrator), RAE Inc, Cipher, John Hopkins University’s Applied Physics 
Lab, Honeywell Corporation, Syracuse Research Corporation, Lucent Government Systems 
(LGS), CUBRC, a University of Buffalo Research Center, Becton Dickinson, Black and Veatch, 
and Motorola.  As Alliance interface with government the task is to identify unmet CBRNE 
technology needs from across government and match that with existing and ongoing commercial 
research and development.  
o Consultant on Chem/Bio sensors to commercial firm developing advanced 
radiation detection technology. 
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o Board member: Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA), National Signatures 
Program (NSP), Advanced Signatures Assessment Board (ASAB). 
o Board member: Albany New York’s Watervliet Arsenal’s Technology Advisory 
Committee, an extension of New York’s Center for Economic Growth. 
o Red Team support to defense contractors for proposal vetting. 
 
1997-2006:  Clarke Consulting, Principal 
 Commencing in 2002:  Served as the Program Director for the National 
Technology Alliance’s Chemical, Biological and Radiological Technology Alliance.  
Established the program after the consortium team won the competition, established all 
initial government contacts, hosted semi-annual Alliance Advisory Group (AAG) 
meetings for senior government officials to expose them to CBRNE related technologies 
being developed by commercial industry and not normally available to government in the 
R&D state. 
 National Reconnaissance Office:  Served as the historical sage and technical 
advisor to the  NRO’s Deputy Director for Military Support from July 2001 through 
March 2006.  Awarded the NRO Silver Medal upon retirement, the highest non-
government employee award given by the NRO.   
o Providing technology consulting services to commercial as well as non-profit 
companies.   
o Maintain a stable of senior, professional consultants to meet the advanced 
technology and proposal needs of a wide range of customers. 
  
1991 to July 2001:  Emergent Information Technology Inc, Program Manager, 
National Reconnaissance Office, Operational Support Office, Head, Director’s 
Action Group 
Led a team of eight senior retired military officers who advised on best commercial 
practices, interagency communications and cross agency cooperation. Identified emerging and 
revolutionary data/information technologies. Advisor on policy issues relating to ITAR, foreign 
release and disclosure of systems and information.  Facilitator for USSOUTHCOM for an 
Interagency Task Force on Force Protection as it relates to Colombia’s FARQ.  Founding father 
of Project Einstein (an inductive reasoning engine that manifests some level of computer 
automation of human cognitive skills).  The 1999 recipient of the NRO’s  James E. Morgan 
Memorial Award for innovative uses of national reconnaissance data.  
 
1989-1991: Director, Navy TENCAP 
 Authored formal Navy positions on national systems programmatic and system's 
capability issues. Managed numerous prototypes dealing with the transmission, receipt, 
processing, and display of national systems data. Maintained close contacts in industry and 
academe in leading edge technologies in computer science, data display, data processing, lasers, 
image processing techniques, data compression, automatic target recognition, artificial 
intelligence, and communications.  Hosted the NTA’s NML on its first Ops Support visit to the 
Navy’s Strike Warfare Center in Fallon, NV.  Creator of the concept and led the first prototype 
development of the Radiant Mercury Multi-Level Secure Sanitizer and Guard.  Defended 
programs before OMB, OSD, as well as the HPSCI and SSCI.  Awarded the Legion of Merit for 
distinguished contributions to the U.S. Navy. 
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1986 –1989: Commanding Officer, Fleet Ocean Surveillance Facility, Rota, Spain 
 Tactical Indications and Warning Center for U.S. and Allied forces operating in the 
USEUCOM’s Southern Region and the Mediterranean Sea.  Deployed and certified operationally 
the first OSIS Baseline Upgrade System (a DCI high interest system).  Managed the integration 
and tactical use of Prototype Ocean Surveillance Terminal (POST); the Advanced Tactical 
Workstation (ATW); and the Navy Exercise Support Terminal (NEST). Maintained unusually 
close personal contacts with commercial industry and academia ensuring that the latest 
innovations in data handling and visualization were available for demonstration and display to 
U.S. forces supporting operations in USEUCOM’s Southern Region to include the Mediterranean 
and its littoral.  Responsible for the concept and prototype development of the Submarine Analyst 
Workstation (SAW); and the Electronic Collateral Support System (ELCSS). Directed 
implementation and activation of the first Mediterranean HF NATO Tactical Intelligence 
Broadcast (NTIB).  Served for 3 years on COMSIXTHFLT’s Command, Control, and 
Communications Coordination Committee.  Awarded the Legion of Merit for distinguished 




Association for Communications, Electronics, Intelligence, and Information Systems Professionals (Life 
Member) 
National Military Intelligence Association (Life Member) 
Naval Intelligence Professionals (Life Member) 
Named Honorary Navy Cryptologist upon Retirement from the Navy (1991) 
 
Currently serve on the following Corporate and Government Boards:. 
* Template Software Inc, Fairfax, VA 
* Research Analysis and Engineering Inc, Fairfax, VA 
* Watervliet Innovation Center, Technology Board of Advisors, Albany, NY (a component of New York’s 
Center for Economic Growth (CEG)) 
* Defense Intelligence Agency’s, National Signatures Program (NSP), Advanced Signatures Assessment 
Board (ASAB) 
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APPENDIX F.  OTHER INSIGHTS PROVIDED BY INDUSTRY 
OFFICIALS 
The following insights were provided by two industry individuals experienced in 
OTAs.  These individuals provided consent, but with the following conditions: The first 
individual, Richard Kuyath, is a general counsel in private industry who requested to 
include a disclaimer that the opinions expressed in this paper are his alone and should not 
be attributed to the company that employs him.  The second industry official declined to 
have his name or company identified in this paper.   
A. BY RICHARD KUYATH: 
Other Transaction Authority (OTA) is a critical tool for the DoD and other 
Government agencies to have to enable them the access to leading-edge technologies 
from commercial companies whose research & development activities are much larger 
than DoD. 
 
OTAs provide flexibility for commercial firms to bypass Government-unique 
contract requirements under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).  
Commercial firms have little business incentive to implement expensive systems that will 
enable them to comply with these Government-unique contract requirements, which will 
add significant cost to be borne in part by their commercial business. These added costs 
will make them less competitive in the commercial marketplace where as much as 99 
percent of their revenues are derived. 
 
Commercial firms have to deal with intense pressures globally and from Wall 
Street to perform. As a result the addition of high cost, Government-unique systems to 
enable the commercial firms to comply with Government-unique contract requirements is 
often not a priority when the commercial firm's total Government business may be as 
little as one percent of the firm's total annual sales. 
 
Additional benefits to commercial firms from using OTAs pertain to patent rights 
per the Bayh-Dole Act and data rights per DoD data rights statutes.  FAR procurement 
R&D contracts are required by law to comply with the Bayh-Dole Act with respect to 
rights in inventions developed in performance of work under such contracts. The same 
holds true with respect to rights in technical data developed in the performance of FAR 
R&D procurement contracts. However, unlike FAR procurement contracts, there are no 
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statutes that dictate mandatory minimum rights the Government must obtain in inventions 
and technical data developed in the performance of an OTA.  Therefore, the parties have 
complete freedom of contract with OTAs to negotiate rights in intellectual property that 
make sense for the particular R&D project involved. 
 
An example of DoD's inability to access the latest state of the art commercial 
technology is Intel Corporation. For a period of time Intel Corporation operated a 
manufacturing facility dedicated just for Government business to provide electronic 
components to meet unique military and other Government requirements. However, Intel 
Corporation eventually discontinued this operation because it was too expensive to 
maintain, especially when compared to the relatively small amount of business it had 
with the Government. 
 
The same holds true for companies that develop and manufacture vaccines.  
Without the ability to negotiate OTA agreements with such companies, the Government 
would not be able to have new vaccines developed by and procured from these 
companies for defense against emerging biological warfare threats. 
 
There are currently some problems that exist for employing OTAs: (1) no 
initiative from top level DoD officials promoting the benefits of OTAs and their 
increased use to DoD contracting personnel and industry, (2) lack of qualified, 
experienced and trained DoD contracting officials to negotiate and administer these 
OTAs, and (3) negative fallout in Congress and the press from reports of allegedly 
inappropriate use of OTAs with traditional defense contractors. This negative fallout has 
spilled over onto use of OTAs in general. As a result, DoD contracting officials are often 
afraid to use an OTA as the funding instrument because of the possibility of later 
criticism by the DoD IG or Congress. Under these circumstances, DoD contracting 
officials are often much more comfortable using traditional FAR R&D procurement 
contracts. 
 
There are many high technology, leading-edge, commercial technologies that are 
either already developed by commercial firms or that could be developed by such firms to 
provide unique solutions for the military, which can only be provided through use of an 
OTA. The warfighter needs to be able to be given the latest available, leading-edge, 
commercial technologies for our national defense. 
 
Bottom line: DoD's use of OTAs with commercial firms appears to have dropped 
significantly from when OTAs were first introduced. This includes use of OTAs by 
DARPA, where OTAs were first employed by DoD. 
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Restrictions and Government-unique contract requirements added by Congress to 
OTAs as a result of negative audit reports from the DoD IG and criticism by certain 
members of Congress about allegedly inappropriate use of OTAs with traditional defense 
contractors have significantly reduced the flexibilities of OTAs and the benefits enjoyed 
from their use. 
 
Examples of such restrictions and Government-unique contract requirements 
imposed on OTAs include: (1) those imposed by the DoD Grant and Agreement 
Regulations (which is a mini-FAR) for OT for Research, (2) statutory audit rights by the 
Comptroller General for OTAs in excess of $5 million for prototype projects, and (3) 
mandatory 1/3 cost sharing under OTAs for prototype projects for "traditional defense 
contractors," which are business units of firms that have either been awarded or have 
performed a FAR R&D contract in excess of $500,000 during the past year. This 
extremely broad definition of a "traditional defense contractor" inappropriately sweeps in 
many commercial firms that may have less than one percent Government business per 
year. 
 
Inappropriate OTA usage should be dealt with individually, instead of imposing 
restrictive legislative policy affecting all of DoD and industry. 
 
B. BY ANONYMOUS INDUSTRY OFFICIAL 
There is less originality in the way OTAs are now drafted than there use to 
be.  This is attributed to the lack of experienced and trained DoD contracting personnel 
we come across in conducting OTAs.  The OTA authority is very broad in its use, but 
there is a general reluctance to take greater risks with personnel who do not have the 
experience or training because they do not have the appropriate level of knowledge to 
properly execute these agreements.  Additionally, there is a concern among contracting 
personnel about being "second guessed" after the fact by auditors.    
 
OTA usage is also conservative, and this may be a result of the problems with its 
usage (e.g., Future Combat Systems with Boeing).  Again, there is concern among the 
contracting representatives about auditors/IG coming in after the fact and criticizing them 
for actions taken at the time of award.    
 
We are still conducting the same amount of OTAs, but now with non-DoD 
sources such as the Department of Homeland Security.  Other departments are also 
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